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Who Gets Counted? Jury List Representativeness for
Hispanics in Areas with Growing Hispanic Populations
Under Duren v. Missouri
“He uses statistics as a drunken man uses lamp-posts—for support
rather than illumination.”
Andrew Lang1
I. INTRODUCTION
It is undisputed that Hispanic populations are growing rapidly, even
in states that have typically accounted for Hispanics as only a small
percentage of their entire population.2 For example, the Hispanic
population in Utah increased by over 138% just between 1990 and
2000.3 According to the 2000 census, while the Hispanic population
grew approximately 39% nationwide between 1990 and 2000, and the
western United States experienced a growth of approximately 27%
during the same period, Utah experienced an 84% increase in the
Hispanic population in relation to the overall population.4 Utah is not
alone in exhibiting a growth in the Hispanic population; it shares this
trend with almost every state, especially with its western neighbors.
Some of Utah’s neighboring states—such as Nevada whose Hispanic
population increased 89% in comparison to its overall population—also
experienced similar growth.5 Therefore, growth in the Hispanic
population is substantial, and this holds true when analyzing both the

1. ROBERT ANDREWS, FAMOUS LINES 464 (1997) (quoting Andrew Lang). As will be seen
throughout this Comment, and more so in the cases it references, people can have the same statistics
yet use them to reach conclusions at the opposite ends of the spectrum. Parties use statistics to
support their position rather than to illuminate underlying problems.
2. According to the Utah Office of Ethnic Affairs, the Hispanic population in Utah rose
from less than 5% in 1990 to greater than 10% in 2004. Utah State Office of Ethnic Affairs, The
Hispanic/Latino
Population
in
Utah
1
(2006),
http://ethnicoffice.utah
.gov/public_policy_and_research/documents/oea.his.lat.0505.pdf.
3. Id. at 2.
4. BETSY GUZMÁN, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, THE HISPANIC POPULATION: CENSUS
2000
BRIEF
4
(2001),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/
c2kbr01-3.pdf. Hispanics constituted 4.9% of the total population of Utah in 1990. Id. A decade
later, the percentage had increased to 9.0%—an 84% increase. Id.
5. Id. The percentage of Hispanics in Nevada increased from 10.4% in 1990 to 19.7% in
2000—an 89% increase. Id.
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total Hispanic population growth and the relative growth in population
percentages compared to the overall population.
As the Hispanic population continues to grow across the country,
jurisdictions encounter difficulty ensuring that their jury selection
systems stay current to allow for a fair representation of Hispanics in jury
venires, thus increasing the possibility of Sixth Amendment fair-crosssection challenges.6 It is difficult for government agencies to keep census
figures current and to ensure that growing populations, such as the
growing Hispanic population, are registering to vote or obtaining driver’s
licenses so they can potentially be included on master source lists for
jury service. The analysis used in this Comment for Hispanics can apply
to any distinct group, especially where the distinct group includes a
significant percentage of foreign-born individuals.
The representation of Hispanics and other minorities on jury lists has
a heightened importance when viewed in light of the overrepresentation
of minorities in other areas of the criminal justice system, such as
incarceration. For instance, Hispanics and blacks, both male and female,
are more likely to be incarcerated than are their white counterparts.7
With a higher rate of incarceration for minorities, minority representation
in jury venires is all the more relevant because underrepresentation of
minorities on juries may influence the number of incarcerated
minorities.8 The lack of minorities on juries is particularly poignant with
respect to Hispanics due to additional factors that lead to their
underrepresentation—factors such as Hispanics who are non-citizens and
Hispanics without the English competency required to be eligible for jury
service. These are factors not typically faced by other minority groups to
the same degree.

6. See, e.g., Kate Ashton, Lawyer Sees Jury Selection Flaws, DAILY HERALD (Provo, Utah),
Aug. 27, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.heraldextra.com/ content/view/191310/; Sara
Israelsen, Hispanics Underrepresented on Juries, Lawyer Says, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt
Lake
City,
Utah),
July
28,
2006,
available
at
http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,640198200,00.html.
7. U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Offenders Statistics (Sept. 6, 2006),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm.
8. The topic of overrepresentation of minorities is beyond the scope of this Comment.
However, it has been noted that minority representation on juries has been noted to provide greater
respect and familiarity with the law for minority populations. Butch Mabin, Changes Reported in
Minority
Justice,
LINCOLN
J.
STAR,
Feb.
2,
2006,
available
at
http://www.lincolnjournalstar.com/articles/2006/02/02/local/doc43e22eeb25514934148817.txt. The
underrepresentation of minorities on juries may result in minorities “tak[ing] the law into their own
hands,” which is a possible cause of the overrepresentation of minorities that are incarcerated. Id.
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This Comment presents the argument that determining a jury
selected from a fair cross section of the community in areas with growing
Hispanic populations is extremely complex. Further, this Comment
asserts that jurisdictions should address this complexity by taking
necessary steps to ensure master jury venires are comprised of a fair
cross section of the eligible population. Such steps could include
developing and applying more precise statistical methods and using more
inclusive potential juror sources. Additionally, the United States
Supreme Court should provide additional guidance to courts
encountering Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section violation claims so
that courts and jurisdictions alike are able to ensure that jury venires pass
constitutional muster. This would require the Supreme Court to settle
questions regarding proper population numbers, proper statistical
methods, and proper and constitutional sources of potential jurors.
Although this Comment focuses on federal juries because of uniformity
of juror qualifications, the same analysis is transferable to the states,
most of which have jury qualifications similar to those on the federal
level.
Part II of this Comment gives a brief background of equal protection
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and the development of the
Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section violation claims by the United
States Supreme Court. Part III analyzes the fair-cross-section violation
test set forth by the Supreme Court in Duren v. Missouri, looking
separately at each prong of the Duren test.9 Part IV analyzes the various
issues raised by court decisions seeking to implement the Duren test, and
argues that (1) Hispanics should be considered a distinct group under the
first prong of the Duren test, even in areas with relatively small Hispanic
populations; (2) only the jury-eligible population should be considered in
the statistical analysis in determining underrepresentation, and absolute
disparity should be relied on except in unique situations; and (3) jury
systems that use voter registration as the only source for jury venires are
presumptively constitutional, but jurisdictions should analyze their jury
venires and add additional sources as deemed prudent. Finally, Part V
offers a brief conclusion.

9. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
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II. BACKGROUND OF FAIR-CROSS-SECTION UNDERREPRESENTATION
CLAIMS
Courts have considered the exclusion of various groups, historically
racial minorities and women, from jury venires for quite some time now,
but the form of the analysis has evolved. Early jury discrimination claims
derived from a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim. Starting
in 1975, however, courts have used the Sixth Amendment as the basis of
such claims.
A. Equal Protection Claims
While courts have evolved away from early jury discrimination cases
analyzed by courts under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, early cases are still instructive of later Sixth Amendment
fair-cross-section claims. In Ballard v. United States, the Supreme Court
analyzed the intentional and systematic exclusion of women from jury
service in southern California.10 Borrowing from a civil case, Thiel v.
Southern Pacific Co.,11 the Court in Ballard explained that “[t]he
American tradition of trial by jury . . . in connection with either criminal
or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn
from a cross-section of the community.”12 The Court also clarified that
not every petit jury would contain representatives of all “economic,
social, religious, racial, political and geographical groups of the
community,” as that would be impossible.13 And even though the
Court’s analysis in Ballard was not based on the Sixth Amendment, the
Court still required that “prospective jurors . . . be selected by court
officials without systematic and intentional exclusion of any” economic,
social, religious, racial, political, and geographical groups.14 Thus, the
Court started to pave the road for broad minority protection in jury
selection despite the fact that the vehicle for protection evolved over
time.
The Supreme Court specifically analyzed the exclusion of Hispanics
from jury service as an equal protection claim in Hernandez v. Texas.15
There, the Court noted that it had consistently held that a defendant was
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
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Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
Ballard, 329 U.S. at 192 (quoting Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220).
Id. (quoting Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220).
Id. at 192–93 (quoting Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220).
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477 (1954).
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denied equal protection if all persons of “his race or color have, solely
because of that race or color, been excluded by the State” from jury
service.16 Despite the fact that it was not based on a Sixth Amendment
claim, Hernandez was especially significant for the recognition of
Hispanic people because the Court recognized Hispanics as a distinct and
protectable group, and that recognition has carried over to Sixth
Amendment claims.17
B. Sixth Amendment Fair-Cross-Section Violation Claims
The beginning of Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section cases was
Taylor v. Louisiana.18 In Taylor, the Court declared that “the selection of
a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community [was]
an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial,”
thereby binding the Sixth Amendment and fair-cross-section claims.19
Taylor also recognized Congress’s stated intent in the development of the
Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 (“Jury Act”): that all
Federal Court litigants are entitled to trial by juries “selected at random
from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division
wherein the court convenes.”20 Additionally, Congress had recognized
that “the requirement of a jury’s being chosen from a fair cross section of
the community is fundamental to the American system of justice.”21 The
Court, therefore, accepted the fair-cross-section requirement as
“fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment,”
while ensuring that it was understood that petit juries actually chosen did
not need to “mirror the community.”22
It was not, however, until 1979 that the modern Sixth Amendment
fair-cross-section jurisprudence came into being in Duren v. Missouri.23
In Duren, the Court clarified its fair-cross-section analysis from Taylor
and set forth a three-pronged test that courts could use to determine

16. Id. (citing Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900)).
17. Id. at 482.
18. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Taylor,
states that while the majority looks back to Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940), as the beginning of
Sixth Amendment protection for jury selection, he viewed Smith and its progeny as equal protection
cases. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 539 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
19. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 528.
20. Id. at 529 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1968)).
21. Id. at 529–30 (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 530, 538.
23. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
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substantial underrepresentation of minority groups in jury venires. The
Duren test requires a showing that (1) the allegedly underrepresented
group is a distinct group, (2) the group is not fairly represented on the
jury venires, and (3) the “underrepresentation is due to systematic
exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.”24 While the test to
demonstrate a prima facie fair-cross-section violation claim appears to be
rather succinct, its variables make the application complicated.
Complicating the matter further, the Supreme Court has provided
relatively little clarification since it developed the test in Duren.
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE DUREN TEST
Since Taylor and Duren, the courts have consistently analyzed faircross-section claims under the Sixth Amendment. In so doing, the
Supreme Court noted that the “Sixth Amendment entitles every
defendant to object to a venire that is not designed to represent a fair
cross section of the community.”25 In analyzing the fair-cross-section
requirement, however, it is essential to keep in mind that the purpose of
the Sixth Amendment is not to create a representative jury, but “an
impartial one.”26 The Supreme Court has stated that
the Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross
section of the community is impartial, regardless of the mix of
individual viewpoints actually represented on the jury, so long as the
jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to
apply the law to the facts of the particular case.27

Thus, the fair-cross-section requirement is intended to ensure the
constitutional requirement of impartiality, thereby linking, if not
equating, representativeness with impartiality.
The Supreme Court accepted the requirement that a jury venire
represent a fair cross section of the community because juries protect
defendants from “overzealous or mistaken prosecutors” and
“overconditioned or biased” judges.28 However, this protective function
is absent when the jury pool is crafted from only certain segments of
24. Id. at 364.
25. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 477 (1990) (citing Duren, 439 U.S. 357; Taylor, 419
U.S. 522).
26. Id. at 480.
27. Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 420 (1987) (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S.
162, 184 (1986)).
28. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530.
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society or if “large, distinctive groups are excluded from the pool.”29 The
Court noted that Congress, in passing the Jury Act, observed the
following regarding the role of juries:
It must be remembered that the jury is designed not only to understand
the case, but also to reflect the community’s sense of justice in deciding
it. As long as there are significant departures from the cross sectional
goal, biased juries are the result—biased in the sense that they reflect a
slanted view of the community they are supposed to represent.30

Thus, the Court recognized overly restrictive selection practices or
categorical exclusion as unconstitutional.31
Four years after the Supreme Court determined that Louisiana’s jury
selection process in Taylor was unconstitutional, the Court again faced a
Sixth Amendment challenge based on the exclusion of women from jury
service in Duren v. Missouri.32 The Court granted certiorari to Duren
from the Supreme Court of Missouri due to apprehension that the
Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision in Duren was inconsistent with
Taylor.33 The Court reiterated the Taylor decision that “petit juries must
be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community,” and that
“jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are
drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the
community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.”34 It
also explained, however, that while jury venires must represent a fair
cross section of a population, this requirement does not apply to petit
juries.35
The Supreme Court established a three-pronged test delineating the
requirements “to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-crosssection requirement”:
[t]he defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a
“distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this
group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community;
29. Id.
30. Id. at 529 n.7 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1076, at 8 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1792, 1797).
31. Id.
32. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
33. Id. at 363.
34. Id. at 363–64 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538).
35. Id. at 364 n.20 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538) (“We further explained that this
requirement does not mean ‘that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community.’”).
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and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of
the group in the jury-selection process.36

While this three-part test has been a staple of Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence for over twenty-five years now, the application of this test
is still evolving. With an ever-changing population dynamic and an
evolving test, understanding the evolution and function of the Duren test
is imperative to a proper analysis regarding the underrepresentation of
minority groups in jury venires.
A. Prong One: Distinctive Group in the Community
The Supreme Court’s holding in Duren does not require the person
challenging the composition of a jury venire to be a member of an
underrepresented distinct group, but it does require that the allegedly
underrepresented group be distinct.37 “A group of people is distinct when
they have a shared attribute that defines or limits their membership, and
when they share a community of interest.”38 Courts have granted various
gender and racial groups “distinct status,” but they have typically not
given the same status to specific age groups.
The First Circuit elucidated some factors to consider in determining
the distinctiveness of a group:39
(1) that the group be defined and limited by some clearly identifiable
factor (for example, sex or race), (2) that a common thread or basic
similarity in attitude, ideas, or experience run through the group, and
(3) that there be a community of interest among the members of the
group, such that the group’s interests cannot be adequately represented
if the group is excluded from the jury selection process.40

Courts employ these factors so that juries “generally represent the
attitudes, values, ideas and experience of the eligible citizens that
compose the community” in which a trial is taking place, rather than
meet a statistical goal of minority representation.41 Courts should utilize
these factors to determine the distinctiveness of any group. In fact, the
use of these factors is evident when courts have analyzed the
distinctiveness of various groups.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
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United States v. Black Bear, 878 F.2d 213, 214 (8th Cir. 1989).
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Id.
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1. Women
The United States Supreme Court made it abundantly clear in Taylor
v. Louisiana that women require Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section
protection when it held that the fair-cross-section requirement was
“violated by the systematic exclusion of women.”42 This protection for
women as a distinct class went back as far as Ballard v. United States,43
in which the Court ruled that the “systematic exclusion of women was
unacceptable.”44 The Court also reiterated its position that “the two sexes
are not fungible.”45
2. Racial and ethnic minorities
The Ninth Circuit stated that “[i]t is clear that race is a cognizable
factor” in determining a distinct group.46 The Second Circuit stated that
“[t]here is little question that both Blacks and Hispanics are ‘distinctive’
groups in the community for purposes of” the Duren test.47 Thus, various
races, as well as some ethnicities—such as Hispanics—are cognizable
groups under the test. In fact, racial and ethnic groups generally satisfy
the first prong of the test per se. Thus, courts have consistently held that
race and ethnicity is a protected group and is considered distinct, and this
appears to hold true regardless of the race’s percentage of the total
population. Nevertheless, the courts that recognize the distinctiveness of
such groups have given some guiding factors that are important in
determining the distinctiveness of any group.
a. Blacks. Courts have consistently held that “blacks are a
‘distinctive group’ for purposes of jury composition challenges.”48 This
is the case even when the black population in a particular area constitutes
a relatively small percentage of the total population. For example, in
United States v. Hafen, the total estimated black population in the
42. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975).
43. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
44. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531 (citing Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193–94).
45. Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193. This analysis also recognizes that men are a “cognizable class[]
within the community” for Sixth Amendment purposes. United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293,
1296 (9th Cir. 1977).
46. United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 1977).
47. United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1246 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing United States v.
Biaggi, 680 F. Supp. 641, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 909 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1990)).
48. United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 1984) (quoting Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S.
493, 498–99 (1972)).
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jurisdiction was only 3.73%, yet the court held that blacks as a group
were distinctive.49
b. Hispanics. Hispanics are generally considered a distinct group for
fair-cross-section claims. The government, in United States v. Pion,
conceded “that Hispanics constitute[d] a distinctive ethnic group” in
Massachusetts, even with a relatively small population percentage.50
Courts have held that “Hispanics have long been recognized as a
‘distinctive’ group” in the community.51 Thus, there no longer appears to
be any legitimate argument against Hispanics being recognized and
treated as a distinct group for Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section
challenges. As the Supreme Court stated in Castaneda v. Partida,
looking at the subset of the Hispanic population, albeit the majority
subset given the time and location of the jury venire in question, “it is no
longer open to dispute that Mexican-Americans are” clearly distinctive.52
Nevertheless, some argument over the distinctiveness of Hispanics—
such as when Hispanics lack sufficient numerosity—still exists, although
it is not pervasive or particularly persuasive. For example, the Utah
Supreme Court in 1987 questioned the distinctiveness of Hispanic
populations in Utah v. Tillman, articulating numerosity as a factor in
determining distinctiveness based on the United States Supreme Court’s
statement that “a particular group must be of sufficient numerosity and
distinctiveness to be cognizable for fair-cross-section purposes.”53
Rather than decide whether Hispanics were a distinct group for Sixth
Amendment purposes, the Utah Supreme Court held that a group’s
distinctiveness was a “question of fact in any given community.”54 Thus,
the court reasoned that even though “Hispanics may be a distinctive
group in California for purposes of the sixth amendment [sic], it does not
follow that they constitute such a group in Utah.”55 While the defendant

49. Id.
50. United States v. Pion, 25 F.3d 18, 22–23 (1st Cir. 1994).
51. United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 941 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United States
v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 547 (9th Cir. 1989), superseded by statute, U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 cmt. n.2).
52. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977) (citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475,
478–80 (1954)) (noting that Mexican-Americans were a “clearly identifiable class”); see also White
v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767 (1973).
53. Utah v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 575–76 (Utah 1987) (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S.
357, 364 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975)).
54. Id. at 575 n.125 (citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954)).
55. Id. at 576.
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and state both urged the court to hold that Hispanics were a distinctive
group, the court deemed that this assumption was “too hastily made.”56
Since Hispanics in Utah would presumably be as distinct in
characteristics such as “religion, economic status, and cultural
background” as would Hispanics in California, one could reasonably
conclude that the Utah Supreme Court was implying that a “numerosity”
requirement exists for the distinctiveness prong of the Duren test.
However, it was the defendant’s failure to submit evidence regarding the
distinctiveness of Hispanics in Utah that was “fatal to [the] defendants’”
claim.57
Tillman may be unique in that the courts generally hold racial and
ethnic groups as distinct and do not commonly place a lot of emphasis on
numerosity. For example, at the time of Tillman, Hispanics in Utah
constituted approximately 5% of the population,58 and courts have
consistently held that Hispanic populations and other distinct group
populations below this range are distinct for Sixth Amendment faircross-section purposes.59 So while some courts may question the
distinctiveness of groups based on numerosity, these courts are probably
in the minority.60 Therefore, it is likely that Hispanics would satisfy the
distinctiveness prong of the Duren test, regardless of numerosity.
c. Native Americans. Native Americans are generally considered a
distinct group for Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section claims. The Tenth
Circuit explicitly stated that “[t]here is no question that [Native
Americans] constitute a distinctive group in the community.”61 The
Eighth Circuit likewise recognized the distinctiveness of Native
Americans, stating: “We believe that [Native American] people are
distinct and form a cultural community.”62 The Eighth Circuit used this

56. Id. at 575.
57. Id. at 576.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 796–97 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that an
Asian population of less than 1.5% was distinct); United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 240 (3d
Cir. 2001) (noting that a black population of 3.07% and a Hispanic population of 0.97% were both
considered distinct).
60. Because the Orange court found the lack of evidence fatal to the defendants’ claim, the
actual effect of numerosity is uncertain. See Orange, 447 F.3d at 799. Nevertheless, because other
distinctiveness factors seem consistent between Hispanics in California and Utah, numerosity
appears to be the distinguishing factor.
61. United States v. Yazzie, 660 F.2d 422, 426 (10th Cir. 1981).
62. United States v. Black Bear, 878 F.2d 213, 214 (8th Cir. 1989).
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same analysis implicitly in United States v. Clifford, when it scrutinized
allegations that South Dakota’s use of voter registration records to
produce its jury lists led to an underrepresentation of Native
Americans.63 In that decision, the court did not address distinctiveness,
but rather moved straight to the second prong of the Duren test to
determine underrepresentation, thereby inferring that the distinctiveness
prong had been met.64
d. Asians. The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Orange, noted that
there was no dispute regarding the distinctiveness of Asians.65 The
protection offered for Asians as a distinct group was present even though
the total Asian population in the jurisdiction was less than 1.5%, and the
qualified jury-eligible Asian population was less than 1%.66
3. Age group
Generally, age groups are not protectable distinct groups. While the
Supreme Court has not ruled specifically as to “whether age groups are
‘distinctive’ enough for sixth amendment purposes,” every circuit court
that has analyzed the issue has determined that age groups are not
distinctive.67 Some courts have recognized specific age groups as
distinct, but these decisions have not withstood appeal. For example, the
First Circuit convened, en banc, to consider a prior panel decision in
Barber v. Ponte,68 and found that “young adults” were not “a cognizable
group” for Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section purposes.69
Young adults, as an age group, were not considered distinctive
because the court did not believe the group shared “specific common
characteristics” or were “reasonably set apart from others by clear lines
of demarcation.”70 While the court found that “disproportionality is bad”
regardless of the classification, the idea that “any important deviation
63. United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 155 (8th Cir. 1981).
64. Id.
65. Orange, 447 F.3d at 796–97; see also United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 1271–72
(10th Cir. 1998) (noting that it was not questioned that Asians were a distinct group for Sixth
Amendment fair-cross-section challenges).
66. Orange, 447 F.3d at 796.
67. Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 1000 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc); see also Thomas M.
Fleming, Annotation, Age Group Underrepresentation in Grand Jury or Petit Jury Venire, 62
A.L.R.4th 882 (1988).
68. Barber, 772 F.2d at 982.
69. Id. at 1000.
70. Id. at 998 (citing United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1977)).
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from a statistical cross section is suspect” was considered “torturing the
words ‘distinctive group’ into a very different concept.”71 Thus, the
Duren test did not require courts to bestow distinctive status on specific
age groups.72 Therefore, unless the Supreme Court holds differently, it is
unlikely that age groups will be granted distinctive status.
B. Prong Two: Underrepresentation of a Distinctive Group
To satisfy the second prong of the Duren test, a criminal defendant
must demonstrate that the jury venire is not representative of the distinct
group established in the first prong.73 In showing underrepresentation,
the defendant has the burden of demonstrating the percentage of the
underrepresented group in the community, although the state may
challenge the number proffered by the defendant.74 This is typically
established by a statistical analysis.75
This prong appears straightforward: determine the representation of
the group in the population as a whole, determine the representation on
the jury venire, and then determine if the group is underrepresented. This
prong, as simple as it may appear on its face, is complicated by three
questions. First, what population should the jury venire be compared
against: total population, age-eligible population, or jury-eligible
population? Second, should absolute or comparative disparity be used to
evaluate the comparison results? Finally, what percentage difference is
required to establish the existence of a “substantial,” and therefore
unconstitutional, disparity?

71. Id. at 999.
72. Id. The First Circuit in Barber stated that it was not persuaded by the “weight of their
numbers but by that of the logic and policy they espouse.” Id. at 1000. For cases declining to extend
distinctive status to age groups, see Cox v. Montgomery, 718 F.2d 1036, 1038 (11th Cir. 1983);
Davis v. Greer, 675 F.2d 141, 146 (7th Cir. 1982); Brown v. Harris, 666 F.2d 782, 783–84 (2d Cir.
1981); United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d
577, 590–93 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Olson, 473 F.2d 686, 688 (8th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Gast, 457 F.2d 141, 142–43 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Di Tommaso, 405 F.2d 385,
391 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 144–45 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff’d, 468
F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972).
73. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). In Duren, statistics were used to
illustrate that 53% of the population eligible for jury service was female, while females comprised
approximately 15% of jury venires. Id. at 362–64.
74. See id. at 364.
75. Id. at 364–65.
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1. Determining the correct population for the statistical analysis
Determining population numbers and specific population
representation in jury venires is an inexact science at best.76 The use of
census numbers, however, is generally acceptable, but as can be seen
from several Ninth Circuit cases77 originating in California, determining
the proper numbers to use for a statistical analysis is still far from settled.
This problem has troubled not only the Ninth Circuit, but federal and
state courts from California to Georgia.78
a. Jury-eligible population. Some courts have held that the juryeligible population is the correct statistical basis that should be used to
demonstrate the underrepresentation of a distinct group. The Ninth
Circuit has opted to follow this reasoning.
In United States v. Esquivel, the defendant presented evidence that
the total Hispanic population of the applicable counties was 22.3%, far in
excess of the 9.7% of Hispanics on the master jury wheel.79 The
government, in opposition to the statistics proffered by Esquivel, argued
that the correct number for comparison should have been “the number of
Hispanics eligible to serve as jurors,” or, per the census figures, 14.6%.80
To bolster its contention that only the jury-eligible population should be
used, the government used the federal jury qualifications contained in the
Jury Act, which specify that the individual must (1) be a United States
citizen, (2) be at least eighteen years old, (3) be a resident of the judicial
76. It has been said that “42.7 percent of all statistics are made up on the spot.” NORMAN D.
LIVERGOOD, THE PERENNIAL TRADITION 335 (1997) (quoting Stephen Wright). This statement of
unknown beginnings can be used with any number and comments on the perception that statistics are
made up rather than calculated by more “scientific” means.
One such difficulty, for instance, is the use of Hispanic surnames, post-hoc, to determine the number
of Hispanics on a jury list. This would over-calculate the number if there were a Caucasian woman
with a Hispanic surname, while it would under-calculate the number if there were a Hispanic woman
with a non-Hispanic surname.
77. See United States v. Torres-Hernandez, 447 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir.
1997); United States v. Esquivel, 88 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 1996).
78. See United States v. Rodriguez, 776 F.2d 1509, 1511 (11th Cir. 1985) (comparing the
percentage of the group on the jury wheel to the percentage of the group “eligible for jury service”);
People v. Bell, 778 P.2d 129, 143 (Cal. 1989) (noting that in cases where the groups must have
special qualifications, people stop being fungible); People v. Pervoe, 207 Cal. Rptr. 622, 628 (Ct.
App. 1984) (looking at the adult population as compared to the total population); Smith v. State, 571
S.E.2d 740, 747 (Ga. 2002) (analyzing Sixth Amendment claims based on the jury-eligible
population).
79. Esquivel, 88 F.3d at 726.
80. Id. at 726–27.
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district for at least one year, and (4) have sufficient English
proficiency.81 The court agreed with the government prosecutors that the
jury-eligible population should be used in lieu of the total Hispanic
population.82 Moreover, the court cautioned that “the defendant should
not selectively include data which supports her position, while ignoring
census data which, as here, also bears on the issue of disparity.”83
In a case with facts very similar to Esquivel, the Ninth Circuit
evaluated a fair-cross-section claim in United States v. Artero alleging
that Hispanics were underrepresented on the jury list.84 Artero, the
defendant, presented evidence that the Hispanic population in the district
constituted 24.2% of the total district population, while Hispanics
comprised only 9.7% of the jury venire.85 The government disputed
Artero’s use of the total Hispanic population due to the higher expected
ineligibility of Hispanic constituents as compared with non-Hispanic
constituents.86 The court noted that the government in Artero used the
same challenge to the use of the total population that it used in United
States v. Esquivel:87 “that the apparent disparity between Hispanics in
the district and those in the jury wheel does ‘not contemplate the number
of those who are not eligible for selection on a jury.’”88
The court in Artero used the Esquivel analysis and reached a similar
result despite the fact that the government failed to submit census
information revealing the jury-eligible Hispanic population.89 Rather, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Artero’s faircross-section claim because “[t]he defense statistics did not themselves
make out a prima facie case, because the defense expert used the wrong
numerator for the ratio of Hispanics to the general population.”90 The
court put the burden on the defense to introduce the correct statistics to
meet its prima facie case, rather than allowing the defense to use the total
population if the government failed to offer more refined data.91 Since

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 726 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1)–(3) (1996)).
Id. at 727.
Id. at 727 n.2.
United States v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1260–62 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1260.
Id.
Esquivel, 88 F.3d 722.
Artero, 121 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Esquivel, 88 F.3d at 726).
Id. at 1260–61.
Id. at 1261.
Id. at 1261–62.
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the counties in question in Artero shared a border with Mexico, the court
reasoned that it was likely that “many Hispanic residents” would not be
United States citizens or would lack English proficiency sufficient to
meet the juror qualifications under the Jury Act.92 The Ninth Circuit
refused to reverse the district court’s “common sense judgment” in spite
of the government’s failure to “present rebuttal evidence.”93
The Ninth Circuit further noted that in one of its previous decisions,
United States v. Sanchez-Lopez,94 it allowed the use of the total
population figures presented by the defendant when the government
failed to present more precise evidence.95 However, in trying to
distinguish Sanchez-Lopez, the court also noted that the figure of total
Hispanic population was irrelevant as “there was no prima facie case
regardless.”96
The defense in Artero presented evidence from a demographer who
had extrapolated 1990 census data to arrive at a 24.2% Hispanic
population in the two counties in question, and “applied a Spanish
surname search program to the jury wheel” to determine Hispanic
representation on the jury venire.97 The demographer opined that
Hispanics were “less likely to be registered to vote than non-Hispanics,”
leading to the inference that using the “voting registration list would
underrepresent” Hispanics.98 The court, however, determined that the
correct question was “whether Hispanics eligible to serve on federal
juries were unreasonably underrepresented because of systematic
exclusion,” rather than whether Hispanics, using the total population,
were underrepresented on master jury wheels.99 The demographer only
proffered data for the second question rather than the first, and more
pertinent, question. The court concluded: “[i]rrelevant question,
irrelevant answer.”100 Moreover, the court noted that the demographer’s
opinion that Hispanics were less likely to register to vote could be
attributed, at least in part, to the lower number of citizens in the Hispanic

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
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Id. at 1262.
Id.
United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1989).
Artero, 121 F.3d at 1261 (citing Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d at 547–48).
Id. (citing Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d at 548).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Cannady, 54 F.3d 544, 548 (9th Cir. 1995)).
Id.
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community that are eligible to vote, thus explaining the lower number of
Hispanics on the master jury wheel.101
In the end, the Ninth Circuit held that “[o]ne claiming
underrepresentation of a distinctive group must, to establish a prima facie
case, present data showing that the percentage of persons in that group in
the jury wheel is significantly lower than the percentage eligible to serve
on juries.”102 The court felt it was in line with the Fifth Circuit decision
that “a comparison of percentages in the jury wheel and ‘the gross
population’ is ‘irrelevant,’ because ‘the pertinent inquiry is the pool of
[the group claimed to be underrepresented] in the district who are
eligible to serve as jurors.’”103 And although the jury-eligible population
would be required when the distinct group is a Hispanic population, there
are situations in which the total population would be an adequate
substitute for jury-eligible population, such as when the distinct group is
women.104 This is true because there is “no reason to think women
would be disproportionately ineligible to serve on juries.”105 Thus, the
court articulated, “[w]here there is no reason to suppose that the
percentage of persons in that group in the population is higher than the
percentage eligible to serve, then the former may adequately support an
inference as to the latter,” but “[w]here such an inference is not
reasonable, then disparity of percentages in the general population and in
the jury wheel cannot suffice, because the general population ratio does
not imply the jury-eligible ratio.”106
b. Age-eligible or total population.107 After deciding that Artero
correctly required the submission of jury-eligible population data to
determine underrepresentation, the Ninth Circuit in a later decision
appeared to go back on its stance when it stated that Artero was “in

101. Id. at 1261–62.
102. Id. at 1262.
103. Id. (quoting United States v. Fike, 82 F.3d 1315, 1321 (5th Cir. 1996)) (alteration in
original).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Courts often use age-eligible populations in fair-cross-section claims, but total
populations are also used with the understanding that a group’s representativeness in the total
population should be relatively consistent with age-eligible populations. This may not hold true, for
instance, if a larger percentage of a particular group is under eighteen years of age, but generally
courts assume that age-eligible populations are proportional to total populations. Thus, courts may
use total populations as a substitute for age-eligible populations.
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conflict with the Supreme Court and the Sanchez-Lopez line of cases.”108
In United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, the court returned to Duren to
determine the “correct” standard for the representation prong of the
Duren test, which “require[d] the defendant to show that the distinctive
group [was] underrepresented in jury venires ‘in relation to the number
of such persons in the community.’”109 The district court had required
the defendant to use the Hispanic jury-eligible populations in his
statistical analysis.110 The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, determined
that the comparison of the jury pool should be to the number of the
distinct group in the community, not to those that were jury-eligible.111
The court further determined that its decision was in line with the
Supreme Court and the other circuits, all of which had found that “for
purposes of the prima facie case, the proportion of the distinctive group
in the jury pool is to be compared with the proportion of the group in the
whole community.”112 It focused on the use of the word “community” in
Duren, and opined that the Supreme Court had determined that the total
group population, or community, should be used rather than the “voter
registration lists.”113 The Ninth Circuit observed that in Duren the
Supreme Court “not[ed] that no evidence in the record undermined the
numbers proffered by the defendant,” and “the Supreme Court evaluated
the defendant’s prima facie case using census data showing the
proportion of age-eligible members of the distinctive group at issue.”114
The court in Rodriguez-Lara also relied on a plurality opinion from the
Supreme Court that stated that “[t]he second prong of Duren is met by
demonstrating that the [distinctive] group is underrepresented in
proportion to its position in the community as documented by census
figures.”115
The Ninth Circuit cited several cases that used the Rodriguez-Lara
line of reasoning it adopted. The first of these cases was Castaneda v.
Partida,116 in which the Supreme Court used the entire Hispanic
108. United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 942 (9th Cir. 2005).
109. Id. at 941 (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 365 n.23).
114. Id. (citing Duren, 439 U.S. at 364 n.21, 365 & n.23). See supra note 107 for a discussion
on the synonymous use of total and age-eligible populations by courts.
115. Id. (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 n.1 (1989) (plurality opinion)) (emphasis
added).
116. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
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population.117 The second case the Ninth Circuit focused on was Turner
v. Fouche,118 in which the Supreme Court looked at the disparity
between blacks in the community as a whole and their representation on
a jury list used to select the grand jury.119 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit
seized the Supreme Court’s use of age-eligible comparisons in Alexander
v. Louisiana,120 again analyzing the underrepresentation of blacks, in
which the Court found that anyone of sufficient age was “presumptively
eligible for grand jury service.”121 This, the Ninth Circuit noted, was in
spite of the fact that the Supreme Court recognized possible
disqualifications for potential jurors.122
The Rodriguez-Lara court then shifted away from Supreme Court
precedent and analyzed the Ninth Circuit case law. It started with its
decision in United States v. Suttiswad,123 in which it used the total
population percentages for minorities for the Northern District of
California and found the absolute disparity124 to be within constitutional
limits.125 Likewise, in United States v. Armstrong,126 the court used total
population figures and found the underrepresentation of the black
population in the district to be within constitutional levels.127
Like the court in Artero, the Rodriguez-Lara court also used United
States v. Sanchez-Lopez128 to bolster its position, but with vastly
differing interpretations as to the actual holding of that case.129 Rather
than agreeing with the Artero court that Sanchez-Lopez used total
population values because the underrepresentation was within
constitutional limits even using total population values, the Ninth Circuit
in Rodriguez-Lara “squarely rejected the proposition ‘that the defendants
117. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at 941 (citing Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 495–96). It is important
to note, however, that the Ninth Circuit failed to discuss language from Castaneda in which the
Supreme Court discussed the possibility of the state proffering evidence of how many of the
residents of the county were non-citizens, felons, or lacked sufficient competency in English—all
indicia of jury eligibility. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 498–99.
118. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
119. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at 941.
120. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
121. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at 941–42 (quoting Alexander, 405 U.S. at 627).
122. Id. at 942 (citing Alexander, 405 U.S. at 627, 628 n.4).
123. United States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1982).
124. See discussion infra Part III.B.2 regarding statistical analysis methodology.
125. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d at 648–49.
126. United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982).
127. Id. at 955–56.
128. United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1989).
129. United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 942 (9th Cir. 2005).
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were required to provide jury eligible population figures.’”130 Instead,
the Rodriguez-Lara court held that in Sanchez-Lopez, the defendant’s
statistics were presumed to be valid because the government failed to
offer contradictory figures.131 The court then stated that the Ninth Circuit
“has generally continued to adhere to the Duren/Sanchez-Lopez view that
the defendant need not come forward with jury-eligible population data
in order to make a prima facie case.”132 The court recognized that it had
required the use of a jury-eligible population in Artero133 and in Sander
v. Woodford.134 However, it dismissed Artero and its progeny as
incorrect due to the “overwhelming weight” of its “own prior case law”
and Supreme Court precedent, and stated that it must “adhere to [its]
longstanding authority that the defendant’s prima facie case for a faircross section claim may rely on a comparison to total population data or,
where available in the record, age-eligible population data.”135
Additionally, while the Ninth Circuit could have rested RodriguezLara on its interpretation of its own case law coupled with its
interpretation of Supreme Court decisions, it decided to elaborate on the
“wisdom of [its] position on its merits.”136 It stated:
Whereas census data are readily accessible, jury-eligible population
data will often be quite hard for fair-cross-section claimants to obtain,
given the difficulty of sorting out from the general population figures
the number of individuals who (for example) are not citizens, who are
not fluent in English, or who are “incapable, by reason of mental or
physical infirmity, to render satisfactory jury service.” Other courts
have noted the potentially “insuperable” burden that requiring such data
could place on fair-cross-section claimants, as well as scholars’
conclusion that “eligible population figures are almost impossible to
obtain.” Requiring a fair-cross-section claimant to come forward with a
comparison to the jury-eligible population thus risks placing one of the

130. Id. (quoting Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d at 547).
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing Randolph v. California, 380 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) (using the total
population of both Hispanics and blacks to determine underrepresentation); Thomas v. Borg, 159
F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1998) (using the total population of blacks in the county for the Duren
test); United States v. Nelson, 137 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998) (using the total population of
Hispanics in the district)).
133. United States v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1261–62 (9th Cir. 1997).
134. Sander v. Woodford, 373 F.3d 1054, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2004) (following the Artero
analysis).
135. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d. at 943.
136. Id. at 943 n.9.
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elements of the prima facie case for equal protection and fair crosssection claims out of reach, thereby insulating jury selection systems
from judicial scrutiny entirely.137

Thus, while the Ninth Circuit did not forbid the use of jury-eligible
data, it did cast doubt as to whether it should be used at all. The court
definitely did not require a defendant to proffer this information, even if
available. Rather, it gave the impression that age-eligible data would be
the most appropriate to approximate the “community.”
c. Jury-eligible Hispanic populations. The Ninth Circuit attempted to
resolve the inconsistency in its decisions regarding the appropriate
population statistics to meet the second prong of the Duren test by
confidently siding with Artero in United States v. Torres-Hernandez.138
It decided that “a district court need not and may not take into account
Hispanics who are ineligible for jury service to determine whether
Hispanics are underrepresented on grand jury venires.”139 Thus, “a
defendant must prove in part ‘that the representation of [an allegedly
underrepresented] group in venires from which juries are selected is not
fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the
community,’” and to do so the court “must rely on that evidence which
most accurately reflects the judicial district’s actual percentage of juryeligible Hispanics.”140 As such, the Ninth Circuit approved the district
court’s use of “data that excluded segments of the Hispanic population
ineligible for jury service.”141
The Ninth Circuit returned to Artero’s “common sense” approach,
noting that lack of citizenship and English proficiency may explain, in
part, underrepresentation of Hispanics on jury venires.142 The court
recognized its “intra-circuit conflict” created by the differing analyses in
Artero and Rodriguez-Lara, but determined that it did not have to resolve
the conflict in this case because the district court had satisfied the “higher
evidentiary burden of Artero,” as well as the “lesser burden of

137. Id. (citations omitted).
138. See United States v. Torres-Hernandez, 447 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 2006).
139. Id. at 701 (emphasis added).
140. Id. (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).
141. Id. at 702. The court in Torres-Hernandez relied on precedent, including United States v.
Esquivel, in which the court used the jury-eligible statistics, even though not offered by the
government at trial, to support its decision to require the use of figures with only jury-eligible
Hispanics. Id. at 703 (citing United States v. Esquivel, 88 F.3d 722, 726 (9th Cir. 1996)).
142. Id. at 705 n.9 (quoting United States v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1261 (9th Cir. 1997)).
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Rodriguez-Lara.”143 The court summed up its approach as requiring a
court to “rely on the statistical data that best approximates the percentage
of jury-eligible Hispanics in the district,” “[w]hen presented with various
types of data to determine whether Hispanics are underrepresented on
grand jury venires.”144 The court reasoned, as it had in Esquivel, that
“using the total population of Hispanics” was “inaccurate and
overestimated.”145
While deciding that courts should use refined data excluding juryineligible populations if available, the Torres-Hernandez court failed to
answer the question of “whether less refined data can satisfy a prima
facie case when more refined data is available, but not proffered.”146
However, it reaffirmed its position established in Esquivel that “a
defendant may not ‘selectively include data which supports her position,
while ignoring census data which . . . also bears on the issue of
disparity.’”147 The court noted that it would be objectionable to submit
less refined data if more refined data, such as data that incorporates
citizenship and English proficiency statistics, were available, and that
either party could provide the data.148 Therefore, while TorresHernandez may not have settled all issues regarding the correct
population statistics, it shows a shift towards recognition that it is
prudent to analyze the second prong jury-eligible populations, especially
when dealing with Hispanic populations.149
2. Statistical analysis
Statistical analysis is the method used to demonstrate
underrepresentation on jury venires, probably because it would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to confirm underrepresentation

143. Id. at 704 (citing United States v. Rodriquez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 941–44 (9th Cir. 2005);
Artero, 121 F.3d at 1256, 1261).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 705 (quoting Esquivel, 88 F.3d at 727).
146. Id. at 705 n.8.
147. Id. (quoting Esquivel, 88 F.3d at 727 n.2).
148. Id.
149. The Tenth Circuit has also discussed the issue of the appropriate population for
comparative analysis in United States v. Shinault, and implicitly agreed with using only jury-eligible
populations when it stated that the position had “intellectual merit.” United States v. Shinault, 147
F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 657 (2d Cir. 1996)).
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without some use of statistics, even if their use is only cursory.150 Courts
use statistics to “demonstrate the percentage of the community made up
of the group alleged to be underrepresented, for this is the conceptual
benchmark for the Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section requirement,”
and this demonstration of underrepresentation is typically accomplished
through “statistical presentation[s].”151 The two most common forms of
statistical analysis are absolute and comparative disparity,152 with
absolute disparity being the “preferred method of analysis in most
cases.”153
Absolute disparity is the preferred method of statistical analysis
generally employed by courts in analyzing fair-cross-section claims, and
it “measures the difference between the percentage of a group in the
general population and its percentage [on the jury venire].”154 Absolute
disparity is calculated by acquiring the actual percentage difference
between the expected representation based on population and the actual
representation. Thus, if the total population of women in a community is
50% but women comprise only 40% of the master jury list, there is an
absolute disparity of 10%.
The comparative disparity method, on the other hand, “measures the
decreased likelihood that members of an underrepresented group will be

150. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). In Duren, statistics were used to
demonstrate underrepresentation, and this use of statistics to demonstrate underrepresentation has
continued.
151. See, e.g., Torres-Hernandez, 447 F.3d at 702 (using statistics to demonstrate that
Hispanics were underrepresented); United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 943–44 (9th Cir.
2005) (using a statistical analysis in an attempt to prove the underrepresentation of Hispanics from
the jury venire); United States v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1997); Esquivel, 88 F.3d
722 (introducing statistics through expert testimony); Duren, 439 U.S. at 364–65 (showing a
statistical discrepancy of 39% in the number of women in the population compared to the number of
women in the jury venire).
152. See discussion infra Part III.B.2 for examples of courts using absolute and comparative
disparity. Other alternate methods include calculating the number of standard deviations between the
expected and actual results or considering the actual number of people. Castaneda v. Partida, 430
U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977) (using absolute disparity); United States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645, 648–
49 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1977)) (noting
that the court would “look to people not percentages”); see also United States v. Armstrong, 621
F.2d 951, 955–56 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Kleifgen, 557 F.2d at 1293, 1297) (looking at “absolute
numerical composition” rather than percentages). However, some courts have shied away from these
approaches. See, e.g., United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1246–47 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that
the absolute numbers approach is not appropriate for small group populations).
153. United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 242 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that while absolute
disparity is the preferred method, it has its critics as well).
154. United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cir. 1998).
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called for jury service.”155 Comparative disparity is used sparingly and
typically when required to “adequately protect the interests of those
challenging the [jury] selection system.”156 Comparative disparity is
calculated by dividing the absolute disparity of a group by that group’s
total percentage of the population.157 Thus, again using the total
population of 50% women and 40% representation, the comparative
disparity would be 20%, as compared to a 10% absolute disparity.158
Although Castaneda v. Partida was decided before Duren, the Court
implicitly used absolute disparity to determine the underrepresentation of
Hispanics159 summoned for jury service.160 The total population of
Hispanics in the county was 79.1%,161 but only 39% of persons
summoned for jury service were Hispanic.162 The Court stated that the
difference was 40%, which is the difference, in absolute terms, between
the expected or anticipated value based on the percentage of Hispanics in
the populations and the actual value of Hispanics summoned for jury
service.163 While the Court delved into a long statistical analysis wherein
it calculated the standard deviation and the number of standard
deviations between expected and actual representation, the Court
seemingly based its decision on the 40% actual disparity. However, it is
hard to determine the weight the Court placed on each of the various
statistical analysis methods.164

155. Id.
156. Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 835 (5th Cir. 1975).
157. Shinault, 147 F.3d at 1272. As an example of the possible distortion, the court discusses a
population with “500,000 whites and one black eligible to serve as jurors,” with a random system
selecting the juror list, that leaves the one black person off the list. Id. at 1273. This would leave an
absolute disparity of one hundred percent, “even though an all-white jury would clearly form a ‘faircross-section’ of the community.” Id. (quoting United States v. Hafen 726 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir.
1984)).
158. This is calculated by dividing the absolute disparity of 10% by the total representation of
the population of 50%. See discussion supra Part III.B.2 regarding absolute disparity.
159. The Supreme Court used the term Mexican-Americans. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430
U.S. 482 (1977). This Comment will use Hispanics as a broader group that subsumes the group
identified by the Supreme Court as Mexican-Americans in Castaneda.
160. Id. at 495–96.
161. Id. at 486. The Court noted that while there were probably some foreign-born Hispanics
included in the calculations, the difference would only account for a 3% difference that was
negligible. Id. at 486 n.6. For a more in depth discussion of the use of jury-eligible population
statistics, see discussion supra Part III.B.1.
162. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 495.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 495–96 n.17.
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The First Circuit has consistently held that absolute disparity is the
more appropriate method to determine underrepresentation on jury
venires, especially when the distinct group’s population is a relatively
small percentage of the total population.165 Despite being urged to accept
the “‘comparative disparity’ method” to calculate jury representation, the
court in United States v. Hafen used the absolute disparity method.166 It
reasoned that using a comparative disparity analysis was not appropriate
for small populations of a distinct group due to a distortion in the
results.167 The court noted that while it had used the comparative
disparity method in LaRoche v. Perrin,168 it observed that in that case the
absolute disparity would have been sufficient to find substantial
underrepresentation.169 Moreover, it then clarified that LaRoche “did not
adopt the comparative disparity analysis to deal with . . . the situation in
which the group allegedly underrepresented form[ed] a very small
proportion of the total population.”170 Where, as in LaRoche, “[b]lacks
constituted under 1% of Rockingham County’s population during the
relevant period,” and “hence at most one or two blacks should have
served under a random selection system,” “[a] shortfall from 1% to 0%
hardly constitute[d] material under-representation.”171 In so doing, the
court also noted one potential shortfall of using absolute disparity, as
noted by the Fifth Circuit in Foster v. Sparks:172 analyzing the
underrepresentation of small populations using absolute disparity may
allow the entire exclusion of a group while the absolute disparity is
within generally accepted limits.173
Some courts argue that the use of absolute disparity is a better
measure when analyzing the underrepresentation of groups that comprise
165. See United States v. Pion, 25 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Hafen, 726
F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Whitley, 491 F.2d 1248, 1249 (8th Cir. 1974)).
166. Hafen, 726 F.2d at 23–24.
167. Id.
168. LaRoche v. Perrin, 718 F.2d 500 (1st Cir. 1983), overruled by Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d
982, 997 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc) (holding that “young people” were not a distinct group for Sixth
Amendment purposes).
169. Hafen, 726 F.2d at 24 n.3 (citing LaRoche, 718 F.2d at 502).
170. Id.
171. Id. (quoting LaRoche, 718 F.2d at 502) (internal quotation marks omitted).
172. Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1975).
173. See Hafen, 726 F.2d at 24. See discussion infra Part III.B.3 regarding constitutionally
permitted levels of underrepresentation. However, it should be noted that underrepresentation of
10% and under is typically allowed, and when dealing with small group populations, such as the
3.73% black population in Hafen, exclusion of the entire group would be within the 10% accepted
limit. Id. at 23.
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a small percentage of the total population. For example, the First Circuit
echoed its opinion from Hafen in using the absolute disparity method in
United States v. Pion.174 The Eighth Circuit also approved of the use of
the absolute disparity method in these situations.175
The Eighth Circuit also appears to favor the absolute disparity
method, as evidenced by United States v. Clifford,176 in which the court
used absolute disparity to determine that Native Americans were not
underrepresented in South Dakota’s jury venire instead of using the
comparative disparity method as urged by the appellant in the case.177
While the court did analyze the statistics using comparative disparity as
well and found that the numbers still did not amount to substantial
underrepresentation, the court noted that it “ha[d] not seen fit to adopt
the comparative disparity concept as a better means of calculating
underrepresentation.”178
The Ninth Circuit has consistently employed the absolute disparity
test, as illustrated by the court’s statement in United States v. RodriguezLara that “[o]ur case law has settled on ‘absolute disparity’—the
difference between the percentage of the distinctive group in the
community and the percentage of that group in the jury pool—as the
appropriate measure of the representativeness of the jury pool.”179
The Eleventh Circuit also uses absolute disparity as demonstrated in
United States v. Rodriguez.180 It noted that the absolute disparity method
should be used with minority group populations that exceed 10%, but is
not the only statistical method available:

174. United States v. Pion, 25 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 1994).
175. United States v. Whitley, 491 F.2d 1248, 1249 (8th Cir. 1974) (using absolute disparity to
affirm the holding that when the total black population was only 2.33%, an absolute disparity of
2.05% was insufficient to meet the defendant’s prima facie case in his fair-cross-section claim, while
the court rejected the defendant’s use of comparative disparity).
176. United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 155–56 (8th Cir. 1981).
177. Id. at 155.
178. Id.
179. United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United States
v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 547 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also United States v. Torres-Hernandez,
447 F.3d 699, 705–06 (9th Cir. 2006) (employing absolute disparity to determine that Hispanics
were not underrepresented in that case). The Ninth Circuit also utilized absolute disparity in United
States v. Nelson, 137 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1260–
61 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Esquivel, 88 F.3d 722, 726 (9th Cir. 1996); and United States v.
Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 547 (9th Cir. 1989). However, see Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at 944
n.10, for the court’s discussion of some drawbacks and shortcomings of the absolute disparity
method.
180. United States v. Rodriguez, 776 F.2d 1509, 1511–12 (11th Cir. 1985).
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Although the absolute disparity method is not the sole means of
establishing unlawful jury discrimination, where small absolute
disparities are proven, as in this instance, and the minority group
involved exceeds ten percent of the population, which is also the case
in this challenge, it is not necessary to consider other statistical
methods.181

The Tenth Circuit appeared to accept both measures of disparity,
absolute and comparative, but still recognized that “[a]bsolute disparity
is the starting point for all other methods of comparison in this
circuit.”182 In United States v. Orange, the court performed its analysis
using both methods and found the underrepresentation to be within
constitutionally acceptable levels in either case.183 In United States v.
Chanthadara, the Tenth Circuit even opined that a court “must consider
both absolute and comparative disparities to determine whether a [faircross-section] violation has occurred.”184
The Tenth Circuit further noted that “small absolute disparity figures
are less persuasive” in cases where minority populations are small,
because “even the complete exclusion of the groups would result in
absolute disparities” within limits accepted by courts as constitutional.185
However, the court observed that the comparative disparity method may
overrepresent disparity in small group populations and, rather than
decide which method was most appropriate, it resolved the issue by
stating that under either method the disparities found were not sufficient
to find a fair-cross-section violation.186
Thus, it is clear that not all of the circuits agree when it comes to the
method of analysis used to determine whether the second prong of the
Duren test has been satisfied. But, while some courts have recognized
181. Id. at 1511 n.4 (citing United States v. Butler, 615 F.2d 685, 686 (5th Cir. 1980)); see
also United States v. Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, 1078–79 (11th Cir. 1995) (using the absolute disparity
method); Rodriguez, 776 F.2d at 1511–12 (using the absolute disparity method).
182. United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 798 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v.
Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1256 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 1273
(10th Cir. 1998)); see also United States v. Yazzie, 660 F.2d 422, 427 (10th Cir. 1981).
183. Orange, 447 F.3d at 798–99.
184. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d at 1257 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Gault, 141
F.3d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir. 1998); Yazzie, 660 F.2d at 427. The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand,
recommended, but did not require, “flexible use” of both the absolute disparity and comparative
disparity methods. Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 835 (5th Cir. 1975).
185. Shinault, 147 F.3d at 1273 (citing United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1247 (2d Cir.
1995)) (noting the weakness of absolute disparity analysis when dealing with small populations).
186. Id. (noting the weakness of comparative disparity as well when dealing with small group
populations).
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merits in comparative disparity, courts tend to favor the use of absolute
disparity, especially in cases where the population of the distinct group is
small.
Nevertheless, while some courts have “rejected a comparative
disparity analysis,”187 others use it in conjunction with an absolute
disparity analysis.188 However, when dealing with a small minority
population, it is unlikely that a statistical analysis using comparative
disparity will meet the second prong of the Duren test when the absolute
disparity is within constitutional limits, barring any practices such as
intentional discrimination or exclusion.189
3. Constitutionally permitted disparity for underrepresentation
Courts have not thus far established bright-line limits for absolute or
comparative disparities, perhaps because it is not feasible to do so.
However, some have established general guidelines as to what figures
are—and are not—constitutionally permitted under the second prong of
the Duren test. In Duren, the Supreme Court found that the jury venires
contained approximately 15% women, while the general adult population
was over 50% female, leaving an absolute disparity of approximately
35% that was sufficient to show underrepresentation.190
The United States Supreme Court found an unconstitutionally high
disparity of 40% when analyzing the number of Hispanics summoned for
jury service in Castaneda v. Partida.191 The Court undertook a rather
elaborate statistical analysis, calculating the standard deviation for the
binomial distribution, and concluded that the disparity in representation
should be within two to three standard deviations.192 Fortunately for the
math averse, few courts since Castaneda have used this type of statistical
analysis. In addition, even if the Court had used an absolute disparity
analysis in Castaneda, one may suppose that 40% absolute disparity
would have been well beyond constitutional limits.
187. United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 547 (9th Cir. 1989).
188. See, e.g., Orange, 447 F.3d at 798–99.
189. No cases were found wherein the absolute disparity was within accepted limits while the
second prong of the Duren test was met by comparative disparity alone, barring a problem with the
system in prong three, such as intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254,
260–64 (1986) (noting intentional discrimination).
190. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 365–66 (1979).
191. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495–96 (1977). Castaneda was decided before the
three-pronged test of Duren, but the Court noted that the defendant had established his prima facie
case of discrimination against the state for underrepresentation of Hispanic potential jurors.
192. Id. at 496–97 n.17.
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Duren and Castaneda both furnish some values of disparity that are
undoubtedly greater than what is constitutionally viable. The Supreme
Court in Castaneda strengthened its decision that 40% absolute disparity
was unconstitutional by citing other cases where less disparity was found
to be unconstitutional.193 For example, a 23% disparity in Turner v.
Fouche,194 an 18% disparity in Whitus v. Georgia,195 a 19.7% disparity
in Sims v. Georgia,196 and a 14.7% disparity in Jones v. Georgia197 were
all sufficient disparity “to make out a prima facie case of
discrimination.”198 One can only assume, had these cases been decided
post-Duren, that the disparity figures would have met the second prong
of the Duren test.
Thus, at first glance, the Supreme Court created a ceiling for absolute
disparity somewhere near 15%. The circuit courts have further defined
acceptable limits. This section will highlight the upper ranges of
acceptable levels of disparity because these are more helpful in
determining the current constitutional limits of underrepresentation.
The Eighth Circuit set a theoretically high limit when it stated that
even a 22% underrepresentation of women on a particular jury venire
may not be “under all the circumstances, constitutionally offensive.”199
Additionally, absolute disparities of less than 22% disparity have been
found substantial enough to meet the second prong of the Duren test, so
22% underrepresentation should not be considered a common ceiling.
Other Eighth Circuit decisions help shed more light on the levels of
disparity that the court is willing to accept as not representing substantial,
and hence unconstitutional, underrepresentation. In United States v.
Clifford, the court found that neither a 7.2% absolute disparity nor a 46%
comparative disparity violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights

193. Id. at 495–96. All of these rulings were, of course, before the Supreme Court proffered
the Duren test in 1979, but are still useful in determining limits.
194. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 359 (1970) (calculating a disparity of 23% from a 60%
black population with 37% black representation on jury lists).
195. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 (1967) (calculating a disparity of 18% from 27.1%
taxpayers that were black with 9.1% blacks on the grand jury venire).
196. Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 407 (1967) (calculating a disparity of 19.7% from a
24.4% tax list and 4.7% of grand jury lists).
197. Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24, 25 (1967) (calculating a disparity of 14.7% from a 19.7%
tax list and 5% of grand jury lists).
198. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 495–96.
199. United States ex rel. Shepard v. Wyrick, 675 F.2d 161, 163 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting that
the population was 57% women while women comprised 35% of the jury venire).
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to a jury taken from a fair cross section of society.200 In Clifford, the
court observed that courts had accepted absolute disparity levels of 10%
and comparative disparity levels of 75%, and determined that the figures
before the court in this case were unsubstantial.201 Additionally, the
court noted that 10% was a quasi-benchmark when it acknowledged that
“[t]his court has stated that in the absence of any evidence indicating an
opportunity to discriminate in selection procedures, the [10%] figure
approved in Swain is an appropriate standard for finding
underrepresentation.”202
In accepting an absolute disparity of 2.02% within the limits of
providing a fair cross section, the First Circuit listed a number of
percentages of absolute disparity that were found, amongst various
circuits, to be “insufficient to show underrepresentation” under the
second prong of the Duren test, ranging from 2.8% to 10%.203 The First
Circuit was not swayed, however, by the request to use comparative
disparity in lieu of absolute disparity, and thus the comparative disparity
of 54.2% was deemed acceptable.204
The Ninth Circuit opinions discussing constitutionally acceptable
levels of disparity have typically found that an absolute disparity of 7.7%
or lower is not substantial underrepresentation.205 Conversely, an
absolute disparity of 15.4% for Hispanics on a master jury list was
substantial.206 In United States v. Artero, the court analyzed an apparent
absolute disparity of 14.5%, but determined that by using the juryeligible population data, the disparity was only 4.9%—within the 7.7%

200. United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 155–56 (1981).
201. Id. (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208–09 (1965) (noting that the Supreme
Court indicated that underrepresentation of as much as 10%, as calculated by the absolute disparity
method, does not constitute evidence of a prima facie case); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 589
(10th Cir. 1976) (finding that a comparative disparity of 46% was not substantial); United States v.
Armsbury, 408 F. Supp. 1130, 1139 (D. Or. 1976) (finding that comparative disparities of 45.5%
among blacks and 75% among Mexican-Americans were not substantial underrepresentation)).
202. Clifford, 640 F.2d at 155 (citing Murrah v. Arkansas, 532 F.2d 105, 109 (8th Cir. 1976)).
203. Unites States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Clifford,
640 F.2d 150, 155 (8th Cir. 1981) (absolute disparity of 7.2%); United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d
951, 956 (9th Cir. 1980) (absolute disparity of 2.8%); United States v. Maskeny, 609 F.2d 183, 190
(5th Cir. 1980) (absolute disparity of 10%)).
204. Id. at 23–24.
205. United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 943–44 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United
States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645, 649 (9th Cir. 1982)).
206. Randolph v. California, 380 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting, however, that
defendant was able to meet the first and second prong of the Duren test, but unable to prove
systematic exclusion to meet the third prong).
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absolute disparity levels typically found to be unsubstantial.207 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit has framed its benchmark for substantial
underrepresentation for fair-cross-section violations somewhere between
14.5% as substantial and 7.7% as unsubstantial.
The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Orange, noted that it had
accepted absolute disparity levels of up to 7%,208 but also observed that
other circuits have accepted absolute disparity levels between 2% and
11.5%.209 The court in United States v. Shinault noted that courts were
typically “reluctant to find that the second element of a prima facie Sixth
Amendment case has been satisfied when the absolute disparities are less
than 10%.”210 The Tenth Circuit, therefore, has implicitly accepted a
10% benchmark for absolute disparity. The Orange decision also laid out
some accepted levels of comparative disparity.211 The court noted that it
had upheld comparative disparities up to 59.84% with the total group
population comprising 1.27%, and that while “more indicative of a Sixth
Amendment violation,” they were distorted numbers because of the small
size of the group.212 The court, therefore, found that even with the
seemingly sizeable comparative disparities, the figures “were not ‘gross’
or ‘marked’ enough to warrant judicial intervention.”213 Based on Tenth
Circuit case law, however, it is difficult to determine the comparative
disparity number a court would find offensive and sufficient to meet the
second prong of the Duren test; the adequacy of the number perhaps
depends on the group’s percentage in the population.
207. United States v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1261 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Suttiswad, 696 F.2d
at 649).
208. United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 798 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v.
Gault, 141 F.3d 1399, 1402–03 (10th Cir. 1998) (7% absolute disparity); United States v. Yazzie,
660 F.2d 422, 427 (10th Cir. 1982) (4.29% absolute disparity); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577,
588–89 (10th Cir. 1976) (4% absolute disparity)).
209. Id. at 798 n.7. The Tenth Circuit noted that “[o]ther circuits have upheld selection
mechanisms with absolute disparities between 2% and 11.5%.” Id. (citing Hafen, 726 F.2d at 23
(2.02%); Bryant v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1373, 1377–78 (11th Cir. 1982) (7.4%); United States v.
Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436, 442 (5th Cir. 1981) (5.45%); United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 155
(8th Cir. 1981) (7.2%); United States ex rel. Barksdale v. Blackburn, 639 F.2d 1115, 1126–27 (5th
Cir. 1981) (11.5%); United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 1977) (2.7%), rev’d on other
grounds, United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 1978); Thompson v. Sheppard, 490
F.2d 830, 832–33 (5th Cir. 1974) (11.0%); United States v. Musto, 540 F. Supp. 346, 356 (D.N.J.
1982) (5.4%), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Aimone, 715 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1983) (5.4%)).
210. United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v.
Rioux, 930 F. Supp. 1558, 1570 (D. Conn. 1995) (collecting cases)).
211. Orange, 447 F.3d at 798–99.
212. Id. at 798 (citing Shinault, 147 F.3d at 1273).
213. Id. at 799 (citing Shinault, 147 F.3d at 1273).
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The Eleventh Circuit also set a benchmark of 10%, but was careful to
note that “precise mathematical standards” were not possible.214
However, the court stated that it “ha[d] consistently found that a prima
facie case of underrepresentation ha[d] not been made where the absolute
disparity between these percentages [did] not exceed ten percent.”215
Thus, while precise mathematical standards may not be utilized to
determine a constitutional ceiling, a ceiling of 10% for absolute disparity
appears to generally conform to what had heretofore been accepted by
courts. A comparative disparity ceiling is not readily apparent.
C. Prong Three: Systematic Exclusion
To satisfy prong three of the Duren test, a defendant must
demonstrate that the underrepresentation in the second prong is caused
by “systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.”216
The third prong analyzes the jury selection system in place to determine
if the underrepresentation found under the second prong was “inherent in
the particular jury-selection process utilized.”217 In actuality, most courts
use the second prong of the Duren test as a prerequisite to prong three,
and, therefore, stop their analysis at prong two if the defendant fails to
satisfy that point.218 Not only is the third prong seldom analyzed, even
when it is analyzed it “is usually the most difficult to establish.”219
Courts generally analyze this systematic exclusion by either looking at
flaws in the selection process or flaws in the sources used to select
potential juror names.
1. Jury selection systems
Flaws in a jury selection system may satisfy the third prong. In
Duren, for example, the Supreme Court found that the
underrepresentation of women in jury venires was due to the system used

214. United States v. Rodriguez, 776 F.2d 1509, 1511 (11th Cir. 1985).
215. Id. (citing United States v. Tuttle, 729 F.2d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Butler, 611 F.2d 1066, 1069–70 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Maskeny, 609 F.2d 183, 190 (5th
Cir. 1980)). The court also noted that it had “adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the
former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981.” Id. at 1511 n.3 (citing Bonner v. City of
Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)).
216. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
217. Id. at 366.
218. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 549 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Because
the second prong of the Duren test has not been met, we do not reach the final prong.”).
219. United States v. Reyes, 934 F. Supp. 553, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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to select potential jurors, which “systematically underrepresented”
women.220 The Missouri jury selection system in question “provided an
automatic exemption from jury service for any women requesting not to
serve,” while a similar exemption was provided to men only if they were
older than sixty-five.221 Further exacerbating the underrepresentation of
women under this system was the fact that women who failed to return
their summons and who failed to appear to report for jury service were
treated as if they had claimed the exemption.222 This system, the court
held, was substantially underrepresenting women in the jury system.223
In Castaneda, the Supreme Court commented on the deficiencies of
the “key-man” system used to select jury venires in Texas.224 The Court
held that although the system was facially constitutional, it was
susceptible to abuse because officers of the system were given discretion
in the selection of jurors, and the system was therefore “highly
subjective.”225 Thus, where the system allows officers to manipulate the
results the system is open to abuse and is under higher scrutiny.
The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Garcia, distinguished an Iowa
jury plan from the “key-man” system in Castaneda and found that the
Iowa plan had a “random selection process” rather than a “highly
subjective” system.226 This, the court reasoned, caused the defendant’s
reliance upon Castaneda in assaulting Iowa’s jury selection system to be
misplaced.227
The Second Circuit found systematic exclusion of Hispanics and
blacks due to a flawed process in updating a jury wheel.228 Under the
system in question, an earlier selection of the jury wheel had completely
excluded residents of communities with higher minority populations, and
even after the list was updated, the resulting system still left the jury pool
with a cross section that was unrepresentative of the community.229
Thus, the court reasoned, since the exclusion was due to a flawed
220. Duren, 439 U.S. at 367 (referencing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)).
221. Id. at 359–62.
222. Id. at 362.
223. Id. at 369–70.
224. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 497 (1977).
225. Id. at 491, 497; see also 38A C.J.S. Grand Juries § 18 (2006) (describing that the keyman system “is not unconstitutional per se”).
226. United States v. Garcia, 991 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Castaneda, 430 U.S. at
495).
227. Id.
228. United States v. Jackman, 42 F.3d 1240, 1246–48 (2d Cir. 1995).
229. Id.
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selection process, the defendant had met the third prong of the Duren
test.230
While a flawed selection process may be sufficient, a defendant must
make more than a statistical showing of underrepresentation to meet the
third prong of the Duren test. Consequently, a defendant must
demonstrate some inherent problem in the process.231 Otherwise, as
discussed by the Ninth Circuit in Randolph v. California, to allow a
statistical showing of underrepresentation to suffice would collapse the
second and third prongs “into one inquiry.”232 Because the defendant in
Randolph failed to show any connection between the underrepresentation
of Hispanics in the jury venire and the jury selection system used by the
county, the court could not conclude that the underrepresentation was
inherent in the selection process.233
The Eleventh Circuit, in Gibson v. Zant, determined that the third
prong of the Duren test was met due to the selection procedures used.234
Because jury commissioners were able to select potential juror names
based on the commissioners’ own “subjective judgment about which
individuals were intelligent and upright,” the court found that the
selection procedures used were “‘not racially [or sexually] neutral’ and
were ‘susceptible of abuse.’”235 The Court noted that systematic
exclusion was present in this case due to the inherent problems in the
system, which was “easily capable of being manipulated.”236
2. Source of names for potential jurors
The sources used for potential jurors may also lead to fair-crosssection claims under the third prong of the Duren test. A common source
of contention regarding jury selection is the use of voter registration lists
as the source of prospective jurors. The Tenth Circuit, pre-Duren, noted
that voter registration lists were “the ‘preferred source’ of names for
prospective jurors” because “Congress not only intended to provide a
relatively large and easily accessible source of names, but one to which
230. Id. at 1248.
231. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 366–67 (1979).
232. Randolph v. California, 380 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2004).
233. Id. at 1141–42.
234. Gibson v. Zant, 705 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1983).
235. Id. at 1547–48 (quoting Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 355 (1970)); see also Foster v.
Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 810 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting that the system was not “inherently unfair,” but
still suspect (quoting Turner, 396 U.S. at 355)).
236. Gibson, 705 F.2d at 1549.
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all potential jurors would have equal access and which disqualified jurors
solely on the basis of objective criteria.”237 Additionally, the court noted
Congress’s mindfulness of the similarities for qualifications to serve on a
jury as compared to the qualifications to vote, excepting language
proficiency requirements, so that using voting registration lists would
perform as an “initial ‘screening’ function.”238 Thus, the Tenth Circuit
reasoned:
In the absence of any specific evidence regarding the disproportionate
impact, if any, of these requirements on blacks and Chicanos, we
cannot conclude that the decision of Congress to adopt the voter
registration lists as a preliminary screening device was unreasonable.
Neither can we say that the district court erred in accepting the
government’s contentions that some of the demonstrated disparities
could be explained by the operation of this screening process.239

In United States v. Garcia, the court explicitly recognized that it had
consistently approved the selection of the jury lists using voter
registration lists.240 The defendant in Garcia “argued that Native
Americans,” as well as Hispanics and blacks, “were systematically
underrepresented” because they were less likely to register to vote.241
The court restated a conclusion from a previous case: “[t]he mere fact
that one identifiable group of individuals votes in a lower proportion than
the rest of the population does not make a jury selection system illegal or
unconstitutional.”242 Furthermore, because there was nothing in the voter
registration process that prevented minorities from registering because
the operation of the jury selection process was not discriminatory, a
“numerical disparity” in minority representation alone did not violate the
defendant’s constitutional rights.243
Another example of a court’s analysis regarding the proper sources
of potential jurors under the third prong of the Duren test can be found in
the First Circuit’s analysis of the underrepresentation of Hispanics in the
District of Massachusetts. In United States v. Pion,244 the defendant was
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
original).
243.
244.

United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 587 n.10 (10th Cir. 1976).
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (1976)).
Id. at 587–88 n.10.
United States v. Garcia, 991 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir. 1993).
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 156 (8th Cir. 1981)) (alteration in
Id.
United States v. Pion, 25 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 1994).

235

REIL.MRO.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/20/2007 11:21:30 PM

[2007

not able to identify any “systematic defect” or “operational deficiency”
in the jury plan, nor did he allege that the plan was designed to exclude
Hispanics.245 The district court found that the jury list was constructed
using resident lists, the “broadest data available,” and that there was no
data alleged or shown that was more representative of Hispanics.246 The
court held that the allegations of systematic exclusion based purely on
statistical underrepresentation were “pure speculation.”247 Thus, a
statistical underrepresentation did not equate to systematic exclusion.
The Eight Circuit, in United States v. Clifford, also analyzed the
issue of using voter registration lists to select potential jurors.248 The
defendant argued that the voter registration lists “should be
supplemented by other sources more accurately reflecting” the Native
American population, but the court retorted that any underrepresentation
was due to a “failure to register to vote” rather than systematic
exclusion.249 The court held that “[a]bsent the showing of systematic
exclusion of a class of qualified citizens, voter registration lists may be
used as the sole source of persons to serve on petit juries.”250 Thus, the
presumption is that the use of voter registration lists as the sole source
for jury venires is valid unless, by so doing, a group is systematically
excluded.
The Ninth Circuit was clear in stating that when analyzing the third
prong of the Duren test, the underrepresentation must be systematic, but
need not be intentional.251 In support of his case, the defendant in
Rodriguez-Lara submitted a report “assert[ing] that the practice of
selecting jurors from voter registration lists underrepresent[ed] racial and
ethnic minorities.”252 Thus, voter registration lists, a seemingly neutral

245. Id. (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 366 (1979)).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 23–24 (citing United States v. Garcia, 991 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir. 1993)) (emphasis
omitted). The First Circuit also compared Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir. 1985) (en
banc) (“[C]ourts have tended to allow a fair degree of leeway in designating jurors so long as the
state or community does not actively prevent people from serving or actively discriminate, and so
long as the system is reasonably open to all.”).
248. United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 156 (8th Cir. 1981).
249. Id.
250. Id. (citing United States v. Warinner, 607 F.2d 210, 214 (8th Cir. 1979); Hallman v.
United States, 490 F.2d 1088, 1092 (8th Cir. 1973)).
251. United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Randolph v.
California, 380 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2004)).
252. Id. at 945 (citing People v. Harris, 679 P.2d 433, 446 (Cal. 1984) (plurality opinion)). The
plurality opinion in Harris held that the third prong of the Duren test was met “with a sufficient
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source not leading to intentional underrepresentation, again came under
scrutiny by the courts. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit responded that the
Supreme Court of California had revised its understanding of Duren
since People v. Harris and accepted the use of voter registration lists,
while the court also indicated that “challenges to the use of voter
registration lists as the sole source for jury pools have not met with
success in the federal courts.”253
In United States v. Orange, the defendant proposed “use of the
Department of Public Safety list of holders of drivers’ licenses and
identification cards.”254 Additionally, the defendant proposed several
possible causes “for the alleged minority underrepresentation,”
including:
(1) the clerk’s office made no effort to update addresses before mailing
questionnaires, or any effort to locate those whose questionnaires were
returned as undeliverable, thereby decreasing representation in the
more mobile minority population; (2) the minority population was less
likely to return the juror questionnaires and the clerk’s office takes no
further follow-up action; and (3) the voter registration list is itself
unrepresentative because minorities are less likely to register to vote as
their majority counterparts.255

The Tenth Circuit analyzed this proposal and held that it did not “find
any systematic exclusion in the district’s jury selection methods”256 and
defined systematic exclusion as “inherent in the particular jury-selection
process utilized.”257 Furthermore, the court determined that none of the
potential causes of underrepresentation listed by the defendant
“constitute[d] systematic exclusion,” as “[d]iscrepancies resulting from
the private choices of potential jurors do not represent the kind of
constitutional infirmity contemplated by Duren.”258 The court in Orange
also observed that “[t]he circuits are ‘in complete agreement that neither
the [Jury] Act nor the Constitution require that a supplemental source of

showing that underrepresentation result[ed] from the use of voter registration lists as the sole source
of names for the jury pool.” Id. at 945 (citing Harris, 679 P.2d at 446).
253. Id. at 945 n.13 (citing United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1445–49 (4th Cir. 1988) (en
banc) (collecting cases and discussing the history of such challenges in the courts)).
254. United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 800 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
255. Id. (citations omitted).
256. Id.
257. Id. (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 366 (1979)).
258. Id. (citing Cecil, 836 F.2d at 1446–47; Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir. 1985)
(en banc); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 586–87 (10th Cir. 1976)).
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names be added to voter lists simply because an identifiable group votes
in a proportion lower than the rest of the population.’”259 In addition, the
court opined that “voter registration lists are the presumptive statutory
source for potential jurors.”260
Thus, the third prong really has two main avenues for attack: the jury
selection system and the sources of names for potential jurors. If the
system, however, has subjective elements rather than objective
components, it is more suspect and more likely to be held to be
systematically exclusionary under the third prong of the Duren test.
Likewise, the third prong may be satisfied if the sources used to obtain
names for potential jurors are overly exclusionary, but generally using
voter registration lists to supply names will withstand judicial scrutiny.
IV. MAKING A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF UNDERREPRESENTATION
OF HISPANICS ON MASTER JURY LISTS
The Supreme Court decided Duren v. Missouri261 more than twentyfive years ago. But twenty-five years of jurisprudence have done little to
clarify certain aspects of the three-pronged test established in that case.
As such, the Supreme Court needs to clarify some issues that affect
Hispanic representation on jury venires. While it is a relatively settled
question, the Court should nevertheless establish the clear distinctiveness
of Hispanics, as well as the distinctiveness of other racial and ethnic
groups, regardless of their percentage of the total population. The Court
should also settle the question regarding the appropriate population
statistics that courts should use to calculate underrepresentation for the
second prong of the Duren test, as well as the proper statistical approach
or approaches, and the Court should provide some relative guidelines for
interpreting the results. Lastly, the Court should establish the
constitutionality of using voter registration lists as the primary source for
jury service while allowing other pertinent sources to supplement voter
registration lists. Thus, as Hispanic populations continue to grow in
various regions,262 jurisdictions will be better prepared and have a clear
vision of what is required under the Duren test.

259.
260.
261.
262.

238

Id. (quoting Test, 550 F.2d at 587 n.8 (collecting cases)).
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b) (2006)).
Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
See GUZMÁN, supra note 4.
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Even with a better understanding or a more inclusive pool,
jurisdictions may not be able to prevent fair-cross-section challenges.263
But a clearer understanding and a more inclusive pool will provide two
clear advantages: jurisdictions will have more confidence that their jury
selection system will be found to be constitutional, and minority group
involvement in the criminal justice system will increase.
A. Hispanics as a Distinct Group
Most courts today will grant distinct group status to Hispanics to
satisfy the first prong of the Duren test, even where the total racial
populations are less than 1.5% of the total population.264 So while some
state courts, like the Utah Supreme Court, have questioned whether
Hispanics constitute a distinct group based on low numerosity, most
courts and states are willing to accept the distinctiveness of racial and
ethnic groups regardless of their percentage of the total population.
Although the Supreme Court has implicitly accepted that Hispanics are a
distinct group regardless of their population size,265 the Court should do
so explicitly to remove any challenge under the first prong of the Duren
test.
B. Correct Statistical Analysis
Clearly, the main area the Supreme Court must shed light on is the
appropriate population statistics that courts should use to analyze the
second prong of the Duren test. Since the first prong of the Duren test is
often assumed or given only a cursory analysis, especially when dealing
with racial or ethnic groups,266 and the third prong of the test is often not

263. See, e.g., United States v. Pion, 25 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 1994) (looking at a fair-crosssection violation claim even when the jurisdiction used the broadest list available).
264. United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that the Asian
population, totaling 1.27% of the population, was still argued by the defendant, and conceded by the
State, to be distinct).
265. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977) (noting that Mexican-Americans were a
“clearly identifiable class”); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477–80 (1954) (recognizing persons
of Mexican descent as a class of persons). It should be noted that the Court referred to MexicanAmericans or Chicanos, which are only a subset of Hispanics. However, this subset was found to be
distinct, and correspondingly it is not a stretch to find that Hispanics as a larger group are equally
distinct using the same analysis.
266. See, e.g., United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 797 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that
without question racial groups were distinct); United States v. Torres-Hernandez, 447 F.3d 699, 703
n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (satisfying first prong of Duren test automatically as Hispanics are considered a
distinctive group in the Ninth Circuit); Pion, 25 F.3d at 22–23 (noting the government concession
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analyzed if the second prong is not satisfied,267 the second prong is the
crux of the underrepresentation issue. Because the second prong is
typically proven with statistical analysis, it is imperative that courts are
given guidance concerning the correct statistics to use and the correct
methods with which to analyze them.
1. Use of jury-eligible population where possible
Courts should use statistical data that best approximates the
percentage of jury eligible Hispanics in the judicial jurisdiction.
Assuming that the Jury Act set forth factors for jury service that are not
constitutionally objectionable, it is logical to then use these factors to
determine if any distinct groups are underrepresented.268 When
comparing a Hispanic total population and a jury-eligible population, the
language and citizenship discrepancies render the representation analysis
more difficult than the analysis of other distinct groups. As a general
proposition, because a substantial amount of the Hispanic community are
foreign born and may not be native English-speakers, Hispanics as a
whole face jury eligibility issues in ways not faced by blacks, Native
Americans, or women. United States government census data has
estimated that of the foreign-born people living in the United States, only
40.3% are naturalized citizens.269 Of the 40.3%, however, only 5.7% are
persons who entered the country between 1990 and 2000.270
Additionally, more than thirteen million foreign-born persons entered the
United States between 1990 and 2000, and only 13.4% of those persons

that Hispanics are a distinct group, then moving to second prong); United States v. Garcia, 991 F.2d
489, 491 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that Hispanics are a distinctive group based on a previous Supreme
Court opinion without further analysis).
267. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 776 F.2d 1509, 1511 (11th Cir. 1985) (limiting
discussion to second prong of Duren test because it was dispositive).
268. See United States v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1261–62 (9th Cir. 1997) (delineating a
“common sense” approach that analyzes jury-eligible populations). The Artero panel noted that “[a]s
a matter of common sense, the percentage of Hispanics eligible for federal jury service in those two
[border] counties was likely to be lower than the ratio for the general population,” due to the
counties’ location bordering Mexico. Id. at 1261. The panel also noted that there was a high
probability that the jurisdiction contained “many Hispanic residents who had not yet attained [the]
citizenship or English proficiency” necessary to serve on a federal grand jury. Id.
269. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL
CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION: 2000, at 1, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/stp-159/foreignborn.pdf.
270. Id.
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have become naturalized citizens.271 Granted, only 45.5% of foreignborn persons entering the United States were Hispanics, but there is
nothing in the census statistics that demonstrates that Hispanics gain
citizenship at a rate faster or slower than any other foreign-born
group.272
Therefore, it is important to analyze the population trends to
determine the prevalence of a large number of non-citizens falling within
the Hispanic groups when analyzing underrepresentation. For example,
in the decade between 1990 and 2000, the Hispanic population in the
United States grew from over twenty-two million to over thirty-five
million.273 During that that same time period, assuming trends remained
constant and that 45.5% of foreign-born persons entering the United
States were Hispanic, approximately six million Hispanics entered the
United States.274 Of these six million Hispanics, over five million of
them would be non-citizens as of 2000.275 Thus, approximately one third
of the new Hispanic population growth would be ineligible for jury duty
based on lack of citizenship alone.276
When compared to other distinct groups, Hispanic populations have
a greater discrepancy between the total Hispanic population and the
foreign-born Hispanic population. Nationwide, out of a total Hispanic
population of thirty-five million, over fourteen million, or approximately
40%, were foreign-born.277 Of that number, approximately 60% of those
fourteen million foreign-born Hispanics are non-citizens.278 Thus, the
271. Id. The total number of foreign-born citizens that entered the country from 1990 to 2000
numbered 13,178,275. See id. Only 1,759,385 of those people gained United States citizenship. Id.
That equals 13.4%.
272. Id. The total number of Hispanic persons entering the United States is 14,157,815, or
45.5% of the total number of 31,107,890 foreign-born persons entering the United States. Id.
273. See GUZMÁN, supra note 4.
274. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 269, at 1. If 13,178,275 foreign-born people entered
the country during the decade of 1990 to 2000, and 45.5% of them were Hispanic, 5,997,693 of them
would be Hispanic. See id. Moreover, assuming only 13.4% of foreign-born persons entering the
United States during that time period obtained citizenship, 5,196,962 of those foreign-born persons
that entered the United Stated between 1990 and 2000 would be Hispanic and non-citizen.
275. Id.
276. The statistics used here are not precise. The purpose of this Comment is not to determine
with statistical precision the percentage of Hispanics in any given area that are eligible to serve on a
jury. Rather, the statistics are employed merely to show that compared to the population as a whole,
Hispanics as a group face different obstacles because the percentage of foreign-born Hispanics to
United States-born Hispanics is greater than the percentage of foreign-born blacks, for instance, as
compared to United States-born blacks.
277. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 269, at 1.
278. See id.
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maximum jury-eligible Hispanic population would be approximately
76%.279 As compared to the black population in the United States, the
percentage of foreign-born Hispanics is much higher. While the total
black population in the United States in 2000 was greater than thirty-six
million,280 the total foreign-born black population was just over two
million.281 Thus, even without taking into account the percentage of the
foreign-born blacks that became citizens, over 90% of blacks would be
presumptively eligible for jury service.282 While these numbers are
undoubtedly imprecise and are not presented to give exact percentages of
eligible populations, they demonstrate the potential issues in determining
relevant populations for underrepresentation analysis.
It should therefore be apparent that even without showing the
percentage of jury-eligible Hispanics compared with other groups such
as blacks and women, statistical evidence makes the use of total Hispanic
population figures questionable when determining underrepresentation.
Nonetheless, despite the wisdom in using jury-eligible population data,
there are difficulties in determining the jury eligible data. These
difficulties led the Ninth Circuit to reject the need for jury-eligible data
in Rodriguez-Lara because it felt that determining
jury-eligible population data will often be quite hard for fair-crosssection claimants to obtain, given the difficulty of sorting out from the
general population figures the number of individuals who (for example)
are not citizens, who are not fluent in English, or who are “incapable,
by reason of mental or physical infirmity, to render satisfactory jury
service.”283

The Ninth Circuit also observed other courts’ awareness of the
“potentially ‘insuperable’ burden that requiring such data could place on
fair-cross-section claimants,” as well as “scholars’ conclusion that
279. ELIZABETH M. GRIECO & RACHEL C. CASSIDY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OVERVIEW OF
RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: CENSUS 200 BRIEF 3 tbl.1 (2000), available at http://
www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-1.pdf. This is calculated by taking the total Hispanic
population of 35,305,818, and subtracting out approximately 60% of the 14,157,815 foreign-born
Hispanics, leaving 26,853,602, or 76.06%. See id.
280. See GUZMÁN, supra note 4.
281. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 269, at 1.
282. Based on the figures given, assuming all foreign-born blacks were ineligible, over 94.2%
of blacks would not be foreign-born and hence presumably eligible. Other issues include higher
minority felony convictions, which can be construed as somewhat circular since felony convictions
often occur at a higher rate among minority groups.
283. United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 943 n.9 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1865(b) (2005)).
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‘eligible population figures are almost impossible to obtain.’”284 The
court perceived that “[r]equiring a fair-cross-section claimant to come
forward with a comparison to the jury-eligible population thus risks
placing one of the elements of the prima facie case for equal protection
and fair cross-section claims out of reach, thereby insulating jury
selection systems from judicial scrutiny entirely.”285
While concern for the ability to obtain jury-eligible population data
is valid, it does not indicate the population values that should be used in
a statistical comparison of distinct group representation on jury venires.
Some courts have determined that “total population figures” were “an
appropriate basis for comparisons for the purposes of a prima facie case
under Duren,” while noting “one corollary to [that] rule,” which is that
courts may use more refined data when the population is broken down by
age.286 It seems apparent that the only reason to use age-refined data is
because of a minimum age requirement to serve on a federal jury, and
courts need not consider underage persons when analyzing
underrepresentation. Thus, if age-eligibility is an appropriate device for
determining the correct populations to use for statistical analysis, then
citizenship-eligibility should also be an appropriate device.
As an example of a court attempting to strengthen its position that
total population values were appropriate, the Rodriguez-Lara court relied
on Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit cases in which the courts faced
vastly differing circumstances: the use of total group populations were
presumed appropriate, or at least not problematic.287 None of the
Supreme Court cases cited by the Rodriguez-Lara court, however,
analyzed group populations where use of the total population, or even
age-eligible populations, would have provided a vastly different result
than the use of jury-eligible populations. In Duren, for instance, the
Supreme Court analyzed the underrepresentation of women on juries.288
There is nothing in the analysis of the underrepresentation that would
indicate that women would be ineligible for jury service at a rate higher

284. Id. (quoting People v. Harris, 679 P.2d 433, 442 (Cal. 1984) (plurality opinion)).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 942 (citing United States v. Esquivel, 88 F.3d 722, 726–27 (9th Cir. 1996)).
287. Id. at 941–42 (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 365 n.23 (1979); Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495–96 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 627 n.4, 628 (1972);
Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 359 (1970)).
288. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364–65.
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than that of men.289 In another Supreme Court case in which juryeligible population data would have had a negligible effect when
compared with total population data, Castaneda v. Partida analyzed
underrepresentation where the non-native born minority population was
very small according to the census figures.290 In Castaneda, even if the
Court assumed that all foreign-born persons on the census were Hispanic
and that all of them were ineligible for jury duty, the jury-eligible
Hispanic population dropped a mere 3%—a number that made no
practical difference.291
The facts of Duren and Castaneda greatly differ from the situation
encountered by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Torres-Hernandez,
where removing Hispanics from the statistics due to ineligibility to serve
as jurors made a significant difference in the statistical analysis regarding
Hispanic underrepresentation under the Duren test. In fact, eliminating
the ineligible group from the analysis reduced the Hispanic population
number from 24.8% to 16.1%.292 This, along with other factors such as
age-eligibility, reduced the absolute disparity of Hispanics on the jury list
from 14.8% to 2%.293 Therefore, in some situations, the use of juryeligible populations has a significant impact on courts’ analyses in
determining underrepresentation.294
289. In fact, the opposite is true: conviction of felonies makes one ineligible for jury service,
and men have a higher rate of felony conviction. United States v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1262 (9th
Cir. 1997) (noting that on average, women “live longer and get convicted of felonies less than
men”).
290. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 498.
291. Id. at 486 n.6. However, if the numbers from Castaneda are taken at face value, they
demonstrate the need for the use of jury-eligible population data. If Castaneda analyzed a
jurisdiction in which over 95% of the Hispanic population was native born, to get an average of 60%
native born across the country, some jurisdictions must conversely have a relatively high percentage
of foreign-born Hispanics, much higher than 40%. The Court, rather than dismiss the idea that noncitizens would have any effect on the statistical analysis, merely pointed out that even if foreign-born
persons were non-citizen Hispanics, it made no “practical difference” in the analysis because it
would reduce the Hispanic population from approximately 79% to 76%. Id.
292. United States v. Torres-Hernandez, 447 F.3d 699, 702 (9th Cir. 2006).
293. Id. Also of interest is that just by using age-eligible populations instead of total
populations, the absolute disparity dropped from 14.8% to 10.7%. Id.
294. Or it has at least removed some jury-ineligible populations. It should be noted that the
resulting numbers referred to as “jury-eligible” populations may still include persons that would not
be eligible to serve on juries, such as felons, residents not living with the jurisdiction for a sufficient
amount of time, or persons with other such disqualifications. This data, if available, could be used,
but without data to the contrary, one could assume these additional disqualifications are not
dependent on race or ethnicity. In the end, courts should use the numbers that best approximate the
jury-eligible population, but should not restrict the administration of justice bogged down in a
quagmire of uncertainty regarding jury-eligible statistics. Using citizenship and language proficiency
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Despite the conspicuous effect of using jury-eligible population data,
the Rodriguez-Lara court also drew on Esquivel295 and SanchezLopez296 to strengthen its view that jury-eligible population statistics
were not required.297 In Sanchez-Lopez, the Ninth Circuit assumed that
the numbers proffered by the defendant using total populations figures
were valid, despite the fact the government questioned the use of those
numbers.298 Because the government raised its concerns in a case that
“was not a close call,” however, its difference in population data did not
affect the outcome of the court’s decision.299 In Esquivel, on the other
hand, even without the government offering the evidence at trial, the
Ninth Circuit took judicial notice of census data that provided the juryeligible Hispanic population, thereby reducing the absolute disparity
from 14.5% to 4.9%.300 This change in underrepresentation potentially
changed the outcome of the case by reducing the underrepresentation
well below the 10% guideline.
Consequently, the pressing question is whether a defendant can meet
the prima facie burden of Duren’s second prong without presenting
statistics regarding the jury-eligible Hispanic population. In the Ninth
Circuit, the Rodriguez-Lara decision clearly allows the use of the total
population,301 while the Artero decision requires a defendant claiming
group underrepresentation “to establish a prima facie case, present data
showing that the percentage of persons in that group in the jury wheel is
significantly lower than the percentage eligible to serve on juries.”302
Rather than answer this question, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in TorresHernandez simply resolved its case by stating that the jury-eligible
statistics satisfied both the higher standard of Artero and the lower
standard of Rodriguez-Lara.303 In so doing, however, it explained the
principle used to resolve the issue: “When presented with various types
is likely to have a much larger effect on the determination of underrepresentation than these other
disqualifications, and hence the focus should be on those factors, especially due to their effect on
Hispanics.
295. United States v. Esquivel, 88 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 1996).
296. United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1989).
297. United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 942 (9th Cir. 2005).
298. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d at 547.
299. Esquivel, 88 F.3d at 726 (citing Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d at 547, in which the absolute
disparity even using total values was 2.05%).
300. Id. at 726–27.
301. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at 942.
302. United States v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1262 (9th Cir. 1997).
303. United States v. Torres-Hernandez, 447 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 2006).
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of data to determine whether Hispanics are underrepresented on grand
jury venires, a court must rely on the statistical data that best
approximates the percentage of jury-eligible Hispanics in the district.”304
Using the statistical data that best approximates the percentage of
jury-eligible Hispanics in the district is the approach best suited to
analyze the underrepresentation of Hispanics in jury lists because it
leaves open the possibility that in situations where determining the juryeligible populations is impossible, total population values may be
used.305 Even if the refined data available is rough, it still probably
represents a better approximation of the jury-eligible population, and this
data should be used. Additionally, a mere declaration that the data is
difficult to obtain should not be sufficient to allow defendants to meet
their prima facie case if a significant portion of the Hispanic population
is not eligible to sit on a jury. Widely available census data provides the
information necessary to compile a list of jury-eligible population.
Therefore, even if the data is not perfect, few situations will exist where
the total population is the most refined data available.
If the United States Supreme Court grants certiorari to any fair-crosssection violation claim, it should hold that the correct group for the
statistical analysis should be Hispanics, or any race or ethnic group, that
are citizens and over the age of eighteen, because only persons meeting
these two requirements are eligible for jury service. To hold otherwise
(1) may lead to a high burden for jurisdictions creating jury lists because
they would be held responsible for underrepresenting groups comprised
of large segments that are ineligible for jury service, and (2) the
remaining members of minority groups that are jury-eligible would be
required to be “overrepresented” on the jury lists.306 Thus, the Supreme
Court should set the criterion that data best approximating the juryeligible population should be applied to determine the
underrepresentation of Hispanics, or any distinct group. The Court
should also approve of the use of census data, where applicable, to
approximate jury-eligible populations unless more precise data is
available.

304. Id.
305. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at 943 n.9.
306. For example, if a Hispanic population only had 75% of its population eligible for jury
service, using the total Hispanic population instead of the jury-eligible population would require the
75% of the group population that is eligible for jury service to have their names included on the jury
list 33% more often.

246

REIL.MRO.DOC

201]

6/20/2007 11:21:30 PM

Jury List Representativeness for Hispanics

2. Use of absolute disparity as the primary source of analysis for groups
that constitute a small percentage of the total population
The Supreme Court should adopt the absolute disparity method as
the best method for determining the underrepresentation of groups whose
populations make up a small percentage of the total population.307 With
this additional guidance from the Supreme Court, courts would typically
utilize the absolute disparity method, while generally dismissing
comparative disparity except in exceptional circumstances where a
distinct group’s underrepresentation approaches very close to complete.
While absolute disparity is not a perfect method for analyzing the
underrepresentation of Hispanics on jury lists, it is arguably the best
option, especially when analyzing areas with a relatively small Hispanic
population.308 As of the year 2000, forty states had Hispanic populations
comprising less than 10% of the total populations,309 and twenty-eight
states had Hispanic populations comprising less than 5% of the total
population, ten of which had Hispanic populations of less than 2% of the
total populations.310 Dealing with these relatively small percentages
causes some difficulties for the absolute disparity method, but it is still
the best analysis tool even with small populations.311 One of the main
advantages of employing the absolute disparity method is that courts
have established 10% as a quasi-benchmark, where absolute disparities
of less than 10% are presumptively valid312 absent other evidence of
intentional discrimination.313 While this benchmark is not absolute, it
does provide courts an instrument to utilize that carries with it some of
the benefits of a bright-line rule, especially the benefit of consistency
among various jurisdictions. Additionally, the use of absolute disparity

307. See supra Part III.B.2 for a discussion noting that absolute disparity has also been used
with large population groups like women. Nevertheless, this Comment focuses on the advantages of
this method with smaller population totals.
308. See GUZMÁN, supra note 4, at 4. Looking at the 2000 census, only four states have
Hispanic populations greater than 20% of the total population: Arizona (25.3%), California (32.4%),
New Mexico (42.1%), and Texas (32.0%). Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. See supra note 307.
312. See supra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of cases that have used the absolute disparity
method and the corresponding disparities that were found to be unsubstantial.
313. It should be noted that “courts have tended to allow a fair degree of leeway in designating
jurors so long as the state or community does not actively prevent people from serving or actively
discriminate, and so long as the system is reasonably open to all.” Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982,
997–98 (1st Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
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with its quasi-benchmark would still provide courts the latitude to
provide justice in the jury selection system; a court can still find
substantial and unconstitutional underrepresentation when the absolute
disparity is less than 10% if the court deems so necessary in the
administration of justice. This ameliorates the potential harshness of a
strict bright-line rule. Additionally, the absolute disparity method is
preferable to the comparative disparity method because absolute
disparity better reflects the reality of the statistics, while comparative
disparity can distort the actual effect of the deviation.314
In contrast, nothing even close to a benchmark exists with
comparative disparity. For example, one court found that even 75%
comparative disparity did not fulfill the substantial requirement.315
While some courts have used comparative disparity to supplement their
absolute disparity analysis,316 other courts have questioned whether
comparative disparity “necessarily produces a more accurate result where
. . . the group allegedly underrepresented forms a very small proportion
of the total population.”317 Nevertheless, other courts have raised a valid
concern with the absolute disparity method, observing that if the group
population is small, even entire exclusion of the group might fall within
constitutionally permitted levels of absolute disparity.318 However, these
concerns can be abated as courts may use comparative disparity as a
useful tool if the court suspects active discrimination. The closer
comparative disparity moves toward 100%, or total exclusion, the closer
a court should come to finding substantial underrepresentation even
when the absolute disparity is within constitutional bounds.319 In these
situations, the courts should also look at intentional discrimination or
314. United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing United States v.
Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 1977)).
315. United States v. Armsbury, 408 F. Supp. 1130, 1139 (D. Or. 1976) (comparative
disparities of 45.5% among blacks and 75% among Hispanics were not found to be substantial
underrepresentation).
316. United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 798–99 (10th Cir. 2006).
317. United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1984) (using the absolute disparity
method with a black population of 3.73%).
318. United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 944 n.10 (9th Cir. 2005) (using the
absolute disparity method but noting its “short-comings”).
319. See, for example, the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254
(1986), in United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 548 (9th Cir. 1989). The Sanchez-Lopez
court pointed out that in Vasquez, however, there was an absolute disparity of 4.7%, but the case was
based on an equal protection claim rather than a fair-cross-section violation claim, and “intentional
discrimination was established.” Id. With intentional discrimination, 4.7% was sufficient for the
equal protection case in Vasquez. Id.
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exclusion, in which absolute disparity may no longer control. However,
absent any finding of active discrimination or defect in the jury selection
system, even comparative disparity approaching 100% may be
unsubstantial.
Thus, while a benchmark does not exist for comparative disparity—
nor should one exist given the large disparities that can arise from merely
excluding one potential juror—the courts should evaluate the disparity at
least as a red flag to underrepresentation. Thus, the use of absolute
disparity coupled with comparative disparity as a red flag would be the
optimal use of these statistical methods.
C. Evaluate the System To Determine if the
Underrepresentation is Systematic
The Supreme Court should also play a role in clarifying the third
prong of the Duren test by resolving issues regarding sources used for
potential jurors and jury selection systems used. This would provide
guidance to lower courts, but perhaps even more importantly, this
Supreme Court guidance may deter unnecessary fair-cross-section claims
in the future. Even if a court finds substantial underrepresentation of a
distinct group, the third prong of the Duren test still requires the
defendant to show that the underrepresentation was caused by systematic
exclusion. Generally, demonstrating that underrepresentation is due to
systematic exclusion of a distinct group is difficult; that said, if a distinct
group meets the second prong of underrepresentation and a court finds
that the underrepresentation is caused by the jury selection system, that
inherent exclusion may be sufficient. Most courts do not require that the
defendant show an intent to exclude.320
Therefore, courts should scrutinize jury selection systems carefully
to ensure that the selection is done in a race-neutral, ethnicity-neutral,
and gender-neutral manner. An objective and random process is far less
susceptible to systematic exclusion challenges under the third prong of
the Duren test. Additionally, a common claim of systematic exclusion is
that the sole use of voting registration lists to select potential jurors
excludes minorities.321 It is therefore important to examine the
constitutionality of voting registration lists as the sole source for jury

320. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at 944 (noting that exclusion need not be intentional).
321. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, Jury Source Representativeness and the Use of Voter
Registration Lists, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 590, 621–22 (1990) (noting that the current voter registration
system “continues to result in the disproportionate exclusion of members of distinctive groups”).
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lists and analyze the benefits of using supplemental sources that are more
inclusive, even if jurisdictions are within constitutional limits without
supplemental sources.
1. Sources for jury lists
a. Voting registration lists. The Supreme Court should decide that
the use of voter registration lists as the sole source of jury lists is
permissible. To date, the Supreme Court has not spoken directly to the
issue of the constitutionality of using voting registration lists alone, but it
has implied some judicial uncertainty. In responding to a request for stay
from a California Supreme Court conviction, Justice Rehnquist, as a
Circuit Justice, discussed the constitutionality of selecting juror lists from
voting registration lists:
Whether this sort of jury selection procedure can be described as
“systematically” excluding classes that do not register to vote in
proportion to their numbers, and whether the need for efficient jury
selection may not justify resort to such neutral lists as voter registration
rolls even though they do not perfectly reflect population, are by no
means open and shut questions under Duren.322

While the issue may not be open and shut, Courts have generally not
“disallow[ed] the use of voter registration lists as juror source lists.” 323
In fact, it has been documented that “hundreds of cases have challenged
the reliance on voter registration lists alone to create juror pools,” while
“[n]one have succeeded on sixth amendment grounds.”324 The
controversy over the systematic exclusion of minorities from voter
registration lists, and hence jury lists that rely on voter registration lists,
is not a new phenomenon.325 Despite the controversy, most courts permit

322. California v. Harris, 468 U.S. 1303, 1303 (1984) (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357,
368–70 (1979)).
323. See Williams, supra note 321, at 626 (noting that decisions disallowing the use of voter
registration lists were “remarkably absent”).
324. United States v. Brummitt, 503 F. Supp. 859, 861 (W.D. Tex. 1980), aff’d, 665 F.2d 521
(5th Cir. 1981) (noting that no jury selection plan to that date had been found statutorily defective for
“failure to supplement a primary list”); see Williams, supra note 321, at 626–27 (noting that by
1990, no challenge to the use of voter registration lists as the sole source for jury lists had succeeded
on “sixth amendment grounds” (citing United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1447–48 (4th Cir.
1988) (noting the failure to register to vote is not a proper basis for “judicial sanctions”))).
325. See David Kairys et al., Jury Representativeness: A Mandate for Multiple Source Lists,
65 CAL. L. REV. 776, 776 (1977) (noting that underrepresentation of groups on jury lists comes from
the underrepresentation of groups on voting registration lists); Williams, supra note 321, at 616–24
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the exclusive use of voter registration lists in creating a list of potential
jurors.326
Along with many other courts, the Eighth Circuit refused to hold that
sole use of voter registration lists to create jury lists fulfills the third
prong of the Duren test.327 The court noted that an identifiable group’s
failure to register to vote does not make a system that uses voter
registration “illegal or unconstitutional.”328 Thus, regardless of the
arguments against the constitutionality of utilizing voter registration lists,
it appears that, absent some intervening guidance from the Supreme
Court, most circuit courts will continue to hold that utilizing such lists as
the sole source for populating a directory of potential jurors does not
constitute systematic exclusion. The Fourth Circuit summed up the
typical circuit court view:
The authorities cited, from practically every Circuit including our own,
in many of which certiorari has consistently been denied by the
Supreme Court, as well as the legislative intent expressed in the Jury
Selection Act itself, as found by the courts, categorically establish that
there is no violation of the jury cross-section requirement where there is
merely underrepresentation of a cognizable class by reason of failure to
register, when that right is fully open. This form of jury selection (i.e.,
by the use of [voter registration lists]) cannot be described “as
‘systematically’ excluding classes that do not register in proportion to
their numbers”; it is a process that comports with the “need for efficient
jury selection” even though it may not “perfectly reflect population.”
Nor does it follow that the voter registration lists do not satisfy the fair
cross-section of the population simply because group members of one
group neglected to register in the same proportion as was their share in
the overall population. The Constitution and the statute do not require
such perfection. It is sufficient that the system adopted provides a fair
cross-section and we find both common sense and precedent establish
that if the voter registration lists do this they are not tainted by some
affirmative form of discrimination.329

(noting that underrepresentation of minorities and poor people on jury lists is a byproduct of the
voter registration system that underrepresents minorities).
326. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to analyze all of the arguments for and against
using voter registration lists; rather, this Comment will discuss the general judicial consensus that
use of voter registration lists to create jury lists is permitted. See supra Part III.C for further
discussion regarding the use of voter registration lists.
327. United States v. Garcia, 991 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir. 1993).
328. Id. (citing United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 156 (8th Cir. 1981)).
329. United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1448–49 (4th Cir. 1988).
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Nevertheless, while most circuit courts will probably stay on present
course, explicit Supreme Court guidance would ensure consistency
across all circuits and would expectantly reduce challenges in the courts.
Yet even if courts continue to validate the use of voter registration
lists to create jury venires, the use of more inclusive sources may help
provide defendants the rights they are entitled to under the Sixth
Amendment: a jury selected from a fair cross section of society.330
Failure to do so will ensure that defendants in criminal trials will
continue to appeal their decisions claiming fair-cross-section violations.
However, as noted by the Supreme Court in Vasquez v. Hillery, if “grand
jury discrimination becomes a thing of the past, no conviction will ever
again be lost on account of it.”331 Therefore, the onus is on jurisdictions
to fortify their jury selection process to attempt to immunize them from
Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section claims.
b. Supplemental sources. The Supreme Court should not invalidate a
jury selection plan because of its reliance on voter registration lists for
potential names. Nevertheless, jurisdictions may wish to protect
themselves from fair-cross-section claims, which continue to be brought
despite their lack of success when based solely on an objection to voter
registration lists, by compiling jury lists using multiple sources. This
would supplement voter registration lists with other available sources of
names for potential jurors, such as with lists of licensed drivers or
residents lists. While courts have declined to do so, some legal authors
have opined that supplementing voter registration lists with other, more
inclusive lists is a constitutional mandate to ensure a jury representing a
fair cross section of society.332 Other authors, however, have determined
that supplementing voter registration lists with supplemental sources may
fail to achieve its desired result—increased minority representation.333
In Crank v. Utah Judicial Council, a Utah court analyzed a county’s
attempt to supplement a jury list created by voter registration and
driver’s license lists with a tribal list that purportedly contained the

330. Williams, supra note 321, at 590 (noting that the “fair-cross-section requirement has
developed in harmony with basic democratic ideals”).
331. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 262 (1986).
332. See, e.g., Kairys et al., supra note 325, at 780–88 (discussing the constitutional mandate
of representativeness).
333. See, e.g., John P. Bueker, Note, Jury Source Lists: Does Supplementation Really Work?,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 390, 392 (1997) (noting that supplementing jury lists with other sources is
costly and ineffective).
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names of all adult Native Americans in the area.334 The actions taken to
include more Native Americans were met with difficulties, such as
duplicated names with slightly varying spellings, and the council in
charge of forming the jury list was unsuccessful in implementing a plan
that achieved Native American representation within the limits set.335
Although this case comes from the state level and deals with Native
Americans instead of Hispanics, it is highly informative in that it
implicitly discussed a problem facing all jurisdictions: what sources
should these jurisdictions use to supplement voter registration lists?
Most jurisdictions that supplement voter registration lists do so with
driver’s license lists, which have also come under scrutiny for excluding
minorities and the poor.336 Even utilizing a list of residents within the
jurisdiction could result in charges of underrepresentation. For example,
a judicial division in Massachusetts used “resident lists” to make up the
jury list, a source that the district court found to be “the broadest data
available.”337 In fact, no indication was given of any data set that would
have been more inclusive of Hispanics.338 Yet even using the broadest
data available, the judicial division found an underrepresentation of
Hispanics on jury lists, although precise disparities were not contained in
the record.339 Consequently, even supplementing sources may fail to
increase minority representation on jury lists. Nevertheless, using
supplemental sources may still facilitate courts upholding jury selection
systems even if the supplemental sources fail to dramatically increase
minority representation because the third prong of the Duren test is less
likely to be satisfied.

334. Crank v. Utah Judicial Council, 20 P.3d 307, 310–11 (Utah 2001).
335. Id. at 310–12.
336. Williams, supra note 321, at 632 (opining that the use of driver’s license lists to
supplement voter registration lists “may seem to reinforce the same biases of voter registration
lists”).
337. United States v. Pion, 25 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 1994). The fact that the data was the
broadest available was not even disputed by the defendant in this case.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 23 n.5 (noting that the defendant wrongly assumed an absolute disparity of 3.4%
based on the percentage of jurors reporting for jury orientation that were Hispanic, while the actual
disparity was not known because the number of Hispanics on the master jury list was never
established).
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2. Use of an objective and random selection process that is race-neutral
and gender-neutral
Even using the broadest data available is not a perfect safeguard
against fair-cross-section claims. Nevertheless, if the broad data is
coupled with a random selection process, prong three is likely to remain
unsatisfied.340 Thus, it is imperative that jury selection systems avoid the
problems associated with jury selection systems discussed by courts in
Castaneda v. Partida341 and Gibson v. Zant:342 subjective criteria, lack
of randomness, and the potential for manipulation. Even if the sources
used are acceptable, if the actual selection system is defective, courts are
more likely to find that underrepresentation was caused by systematic
exclusion or inherent problems in the system.343
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has consistently held that defendants have a
fundamental right to a jury composed of persons selected from a fair
cross section of society. This ideal, some have argued, has gone largely
unrealized.344 The exact cause of lack of a fair cross section on many
juries cannot be pinpointed in most instances.
One problem facing jurisdictions attempting to create jury lists that
represent a fair cross section of society is the data being used: imprecise
census numbers, problems recreating the number of minority groups
based on last names after the fact, and—especially in dealing with the
underrepresentation of Hispanics—uncertainty regarding the correct
population statistics to use when analyzing their underrepresentation.
Additional problems arise because courts do not apply statistical analysis
consistently and jurisdictions and divisions fail to consistently employ
their selection systems.
The Supreme Court exacerbated the problems of creating
representative jury lists by adopting a three-pronged test for determining

340. Id.
341. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977) (citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475,
478–79 (1954)); see also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767 (1973).
342. Gibson v. Zant, 705 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1983).
343. Pion, 25 F.3d at 23.
344. See Robert C. Walters et al., Jury of Our Peers: An Unfulfilled Constitutional Promise,
58 SMU L. REV. 319, 319 (2005) (noting that “[m]ore than six decades later, the promise of a ‘jury
of our peers’ remains largely unfulfilled in many jurisdictions throughout the country” and noting
that “jury panels or jury venires are not representative of . . . local communities”).
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unconstitutional underrepresentation while failing to give proper
guidance on the correct use of the test for the past twenty-five years. In
dealing with underrepresentation of Hispanics on master jury lists, the
Supreme Court could settle many areas of previously uncertain law by
specifically holding that (1) Hispanics are always a distinct group,
regardless of population percentages; (2) jury-eligible populations should
be used, barring any extraordinary circumstances; (3) the courts should
use the absolute disparity test with a presumed ceiling of ten percent,
while utilizing comparative disparity to safeguard against the intentional
exclusion of small population groups; and (4) voter registration lists and
certain supplemental sources constitute viable constitutional resources
for populating a directory of potential jurors.
By settling these questions, the Supreme Court would provide
guidance to courts trying to apply the Duren test, provide guidance to
jurisdictions trying to implement a constitutionally protected jury
selection system, and provide protection to defendants in criminal
proceedings that require a jury drawn from a fair cross section of society.
In so doing, the Supreme Court would help ensure criminal defendants’
fundamental right to a jury selected from a truly fair cross section of
society.

Stephen E. Reil
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